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Determinants of Iranian Foreign Policy:
The Impact of Systemic, Domestic and Ideologic Factors

by

James H. Kruse
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Central Michigan University , 19 81

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1994

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13. ABSTRACT

It

This thesis attempts to explain the origin of state behavior in international politics,
compares the arguments of state level theorists who emphasize the decisive role that
internal attributes, including domestic politics, political elite and regime ideology, to that
of structuralists, who focus on the decisive impact of the structure of the international
system. The difference is crucial: do we examine domestic politics in order to predict
state behavior in international affairs or do we assume that any state, given its place in the
international system, will act similarly without regard to these internal factors?

The case study examined is Iran, from the early 1960s to 1989. During this period, the
international system remained bi-polar, dominated by the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivlary. The
internal attributes of Iran changed radically, however, as a result of its 1979 revolution.
With such a fundamental shift, state level theorists would expect a radical change in
Iranian foreign policy. With the continuity of the international system, structuralists
would expect essential continuity in Iran's external behavior.

This thesis shows that despite rhetorical changes, Iranian foreign policy remained
fundamentally the same under the Shah and the Ayatollah. The structural approach is a
more useful guide to understanding state behavior.

14. SUBJECT TERMS International Relations, Foreign Policy, Iran

15. NUMBER OF
PAGES 125

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ABSTRACT
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to explain the origin of state behavior in international
politics. It compares the arguments of state level theorists who emphasize the
decisive role that internal attributes, including domestic politics, political elite
and regime ideology, to that of structuralists, who focus on the decisive impact
of the structure of the international system. The difference is crucial: do we
examine domestic politics in order to predict state behavior in international
affairs or do we assume that any state, given its place in the international
system, will act similarly without regard to these internal factors?

The case study examined is Iran, from the early 1960s to 1989. During
this period, the international system remained bi-polar, dominated by the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. rivlary. The internal attributes of Iran changed radically, however, as
a result of its 1979 revolution. With such a fundamental shift, state level
theorists would expect a radical change in Iranian foreign policy. With the
continuity of the international system, structuralists would expect essential
continuity in Iran's external behavior.

This thesis shows that despite rhetorical changes, Iranian foreign policy
remained fundamentally the same under the Shah and the Ayatollah. The
structural approach is a more useful guide to understanding state behavior.

111

~7Zjuo

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis attempts to explain the origin of state behavior in
international politics. It compares the arguments of state level theorists who
emphasize the decisive role that internal attributes, including domestic politics,
political elite and regime ideology, to that of structuralists, who discount these
internal attributes, and focus instead on the decisive impact of the structure of
the international system. The difference is crucial: do we examine domestic
politics in order to predict state behavior in international affairs or do we
assume that any state, given its place in the international system, will act
similarly without regard to these internal factors?

Iran provides a unique case to compare the expectations of these two
theoretical orientations. Following the Islamic Revolution, there was a drastic
change in the nature of the internal attributes of Iran. The character of
domestic politics changed, the composition of the political elite changed and
the ideology of the regime changed. The international system, however, did
not change as a result of the Islamic revolution; the bipolar system that
characterized the Shah's reign continued for the first ten years of the Islamic
Republic. These two orientations, then, would expect radically different types
of behavior in international politics from Revolutionary Iran. State level
theorists would expect a fundamental change in the nature and substance of
Iranian foreign policy while Structural theorists would expect major

iv

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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continuities, with only stylistic changes from Pahlavi to Islamic Iran.

Structuralists are primarily concerned with important issues dealing
with national survival, and the strategies regimes develop to ensure their
security. In these issues, they are clearly correct. In issues regarding state
survival, neither domestic politics, composition of the political elite, nor regime
ideology made any difference. When confronted with destruction of its
revolutionary regime by the Iraqi invasion, Iran abandoned its efforts to isolate
itself from the international system and sought arms from its most repugnant
ideological enemies, the U.S., Israel and the Soviet Union. It engaged in
balancing behavior, allying with Syria, a secular state based on Arab
nationalism. It sought to market its oil to any nation that would purchase it,
often selling on the spot market to American companies, below the posted
price. Relations between Islamic Iran and the superpowers waxed and waned
depending on the level of threat that Iran perceived was posed by the
opposing superpower. Iran sought to undermine the forces arrayed against it
in the gulf through conciliatory policies toward regimes such as the U.A.E. and
Qatar that were sympathetic to its views.

In short, Iran was, as predicted by structural theory, socialized by, and
participated in, the international system.

The case of Iran also illustrates that ideology makes little
difference in the conduct of relations between nations. Whether purchasing
arms, marketing its oil or soliciting financial assistance, ideology has not been

a constraint on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.

All states, including revolutionary states such as Iran, the current regime
in Haiti and Islamic regimes that are threatening to emerge in various Middle
Eastern states, are clearly constrained by the international system. It is
certainly possible, and in some cases likely, that these states will oppose U.S.
strategic or regional interests, but they are still vulnerable to traditional power
politics.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 6

A. STRUCTURAL REALISM 9

B. DECISION MAKING PROCESS 18

C. CONCLUSION 24

III. INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF PAHLAVI IRAN 26

A. DOMESTIC POLITICS 26

B. THE POLITICAL ELITE 31

C. IDEOLOGY 33

D. CONCLUSION 35

IV. INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 36

A. DOMESTIC POLITICS 36

1 . The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Iran 37

2. The Bani-Sadr Presidencv 41

3. The Consolidation of Clerical Power 47

B. POLITICAL ELITE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 51

C. IDEOLOGY 53

D. CONCLUSION 55

V. FOREIGN POLICY CONDUCT 57

A. RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS 57

1. The Monarchy and the Superpowers 58

2. Islamic Iran and the Superpowers 67

B. IRAN'S NEIGHBORS 79

1. Israel 80

2. Turkey 89

3. Pakistan 93

C. RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD 95

1. Iraq 96

2. Syria 100

3. The Gulf States 103

VI. CONCLUSION 108

BIBLIOGRAPHY 112

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 115

vii

I. INTRODUCTION

While there are many different theories that attempt to explain the

nature of international relations and the formulation of foreign policy, two

very different orientations dominate the discourse. Many international

relations (IR) theorists assert that domestic factors have little impact on the

relations between states, and focus instead on the structure of the international

system as the primary determinant of state behavior in the international realm.

Many historians and students of comparative politics disagree, arguing that

domestic politics and ideology are decisive components of foreign policy

formulation.1 In a volume on the role of ideology in Middle Eastern politics,

Robert J. Pranger argues that:

Every one of the forms of ideology and power in the Middle East has
serious implications for international as well as regional security.
Increasingly it is recognized by specialists in international relations that the
internal working of movements and regimes, constantly changing as events
interact with actors and institutions have important effects on conflict
within the wider international order.2

'Hereafter I will refer to those of the first school, which are often called
neo-realists, as Structuralists and the second school as state level theorists.
Although these terms are vague and encompass a wide variety different
theories in each category, they do highlight this fundamental distinction
between these two theoretical orientations.

2Robert J. Pranger "Introduction", Ideology and Power in the Middle East, ed
by Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, (Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 1988), p. 27.

1

Additionally, R.K. Ramazani asserts, in his history of Iranian foreign
policy, that "Generally the relationship between foreign policy and domestic
conditions is easily underestimated."3

As Pranger noted, even scholars within the international relations
discipline disagree on the importance of systemic versus domestic factors in
explaining state behavior in world politics. Many theorists believe that
internal attributes of states, including domestic politics, the composition of the
political elite and the regime's ideology play the decisive role in the crafting of
foreign policy.

These two schools of thought would predict very different types of state
behavior in international relations. State level theorists would expect that since
there are a variety of different ideologies, political elites and domestic political
struggles, states would exhibit a variety of very different types of behavior in
international politics. Structuralists on the other hand, would expect that since
there is only one international system at a given time, states, despite their
different internal characteristics, would engage in very similar types of
behavior.

While a single case study can neither completely validate nor
completely discredit either theoretical orientation, Iran is an ideal case study to
compare the expectations of these two orientations. Everything that the state

3Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, A Study of Foreign
Policy in Modernizing Nations, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1975), p. 389.

level theorists declare to be important in foreign policy formulation changed
following the 1979 revolution: the leadership changed, the nature of domestic
politics changed and the ideology changed. Everything that the Structuralists
believe is important in determining state behavior in the international politics
remained the same. The bipolar international system remained in place
throughout the first decade of Islamic rule. These two orientations would thus
predict radically different foreign policy outcomes from these two very
different regimes. State level theorists would expect a radical change in the
nature and conduct of foreign policy following the revolution. Structuralists
however, would expect major continuities in the conduct of foreign policy with
only stylistic changes from Pahlavi to Islamic Iran.

Iran is also a great case study due to its vital geostrategic location. Iran
is strategically located in the Middle East, a setting which offers a unique
juxtaposition of these contending theories. Iran was the focus of the "great
game" between great power rivals Russia and Great Britain for over a century.
The initial salvos of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet
Union were waged over the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran
following the second World War. Additionally, the region was uniquely
anarchic, experiencing numerous"coups d' etats, civil wars, revolutions, and
interstate conflicts..."4 These frequent disruptions spawned an amazing variety

4Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988
(New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 70.

of ideologies to justify the new social order that the revolutionaries promoted.
Wahabbism, pan-Arabism (including Nasserism, and Syrian and Iraqi versions
of Ba'athism), nationalism and pan-Islam all sought to establish a more open
(or independent, egalitarian or just) society on earth. Further, the extent of
state and substate actors attempting to influence state behavior within the
region is unmatched in other areas. The geostrategic location of Iran
guarantees that it will be the focus of continuing interest for both regional
actors and superpowers in the future.

Finally, Iran is an exceptional case study due to the level of interest in
the nation. Due to its strategic location, great oil wealth, rapid modernization,
Islamic ideology and its internal turmoil, many scholars have conducted
research on all facets of Iranian society, government and policy, both before
and after the revolution. The Islamic Revolution occurred during the mass
media age and its causes and results are well documented, although much
debated. This documentation makes it possible to compare the foreign policy
formulation and Iranian behavior in international politics under both
Mohammed Reza Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini.

This thesis will examine foreign policy formulation in both Pahlavi and
Islamic Iran and compare the behavior of both regimes in international politics.
I will show that although Islamic Iran initially attempted to isolate itself from
international politics, it was quickly socialized to the international system.
Despite the often disjointed and inconsistent nature of foreign policy formulation in

the Islamic Republic, the behavior of Iran in international affairs was remarkably
similar to that of Pahlavi Iran. Despite acerbic rhetoric to both superpowers and
to many of its regional neighbors, Iran often pursued pragmatic policies
towards these ideological enemies. In short, the constraints of the international
system played the decisive role in the determination of Iranian foreign policy.

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

There is debate between political scientists over which level of analysis
is appropriate for the study of international relations. This debate between
the two schools was sharply defined by the publication of Kenneth Waltz'
classic Theory of International Politics. Waltz contends that the international
system is made up of states which are like units, and that systemic forces not
internal attributes, play a decisive role in the determination of relations
between states. "It is not possible to understand world politics simply by
looking inside of states."5 His critics argue that "the units do matter"6 and that
"the attributes of interest here are those relating to the internal cultural,
political, and economic systems of states."7 Many IR theorists accept the
importance of structural factors in international relations. There is, however,
little agreement on the definition of the structure of the international system
and the amount of emphasis given to its various components. Robert

5Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House,
1979), p.65.

6Helen Milner, "A Critique of Anarchy" in International Politics, 3rd ed, ed by
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992),
p.34.

7Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War", paper prepared for the Journal
of Interdisciplinary History's conference on "The Origins and Preventions of
Major Wars," New England Center of the University of New Hampshire,
Durham, NH Oct 22-24, 1986, p. 5.

Keohane presents a lively debate over these various aspects of structural
realism.8 .

The debate is even more heated however, between structuralists and
state level theorists who argue that domestic factors play a larger role in
determining state behavior in world politics. Graham Allison's classic work on
the Cuban Missile Crisis9 pioneered the research on what has come to be
known as bureaucratic politics. In this volume, he analyzes three models
which he believes are useful in explaining foreign policy outcomes. While
emphasizing different levels of analysis, all three of his models depend on an
understanding of the internal characteristics of the individual states. Daniel
Wirls makes a strong argument for the primacy of domestic, especially
electoral politics in his study of the Reagan era arms buildup.10 James
Lindsay and Kenneth Mayer have developed separate research supporting
Wirls' argument in favor of domestic level influences in defense related

8Robert Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1986).

9Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

10Daniel Wirls, Buildup: the Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era, ( Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1992).

issues.11 John L. Gaddis' classic work on U.S. -Soviet relations also supports the
case for domestic determinants of foreign policy.12

Some scholars have attempted to transcend the levels of analysis
question to determine how systemic factors interact with domestic factors in
the determination of foreign policy. Alexander George argues that scholarly
research has failed to provide policy makers with the types of information that
is needed to enact coherent policy. He contends that structural realism fails to
account for important variables that influence policy makers' choices "such as
domestic structure and politics, ideology, belief systems, images of the
opponent, bureaucratic politics, strategy and bargaining."13 George recognizes
that much still needs to be done and calls for academics studying international
relations to develop a rich theory of foreign policy which can account for the
large number of variables that can affect foreign policy formulation.

Snyder and Diesing attempt to synthesize decision making and

information processing theories with the structural model, however, their

result depends on the:

attributes of the state actors-their national styles and operational codes,
the nature of their decision making process, and the values, images, and

nSee James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1991) and Kenneth R. Mayer, The Political Economy of
Defense Contracting, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

12John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

13 Alexander George, Bridging the Gap, Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy,
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 113.

8

relative influence of the individuals and agents who participate in the
process.14

To understand the nature of the very different predictions that the two

orientations would make regarding Iranian behavior in world politics

following the revolution, one must be familiar with the competing views. The

following is a brief review of some of the theories that are representative of

the competing orientations in international relations theory, focusing on their

different views on the determinants of state behavior and the different

predictions they would make in the Iranian case.

A. STRUCTURAL REALISM

In his Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz develops a rigorous
systemic theory to explain certain outcomes in international relations. Waltz is
specifically interested in what effect the structure of international politics has
on the interaction of the states that make up the system. Waltz' theory does
not attempt to explain the formulation of foreign policy of individual states,
"To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal
gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf."15 What Waltz'
systemic theory does explain is the nature of structural constraints that limit

14Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, Bargaining,
Decision Making and System Structure in International Crisis, (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 479. original emphasis.

15Waltz,p. 121.

the freedom of action of all states. It provides insight into the general patterns
of behavior that states in the international system engage in; why states in
similar situations behave in a similar fashion, despite their many internal
differences.

To Waltz, the international system is composed of a political structure
that is defined by its three attributes: the principle by which it is organized;
the differentiation of participating units and specification of their functions;
and finally, the distribution of capabilities among the units. As opposed to the
domestic arena, which is centralized and hierarchic, the international system is
decentralized and anarchic. For Waltz, anarchy is defined not as chaos, but
merely as unordered. One ramification of this decentralized anarchic structure
is that each state in the system must operate on a self-help principle. There is
no organization to which states in the international arena have surrendered
their sovereignty; all states are forced to pursue their own interests without
recourse to a central authority. The motivation of the individual states,
assumed, rather than described, is survival. This goal of state survival is
fundamental to Waltz' theory. While all states have a variety of goals, state
survival is a prerequisite for the realization of any of these other secondary
issues. While this system obviously cannot be maintained if all of the actors
lose interest in self preservation, it will persist as long as most states pursue
efforts to maintain their individual political identity.

10

This structure imposes significant constraints on state behavior. While
some states may wish to disregard these constraints, they do so at their peril.
The international system mirrors the competitive economic market which
rewards some firms with high profits, while condemning others to
bankruptcy- Competition compels less successful firms to emulate the more
successful ones. States in the international system also engage in this type of
emulation. New states in the system quickly become socialized to the
constraints of the system and behave accordingly, or cease to exist as a
sovereign entity. Waltz cites the behavior of Bolshevik USSR as a classic
example of this socialization. In the early years, the new Soviet state preached
international revolution and "flouted the conventions of diplomacy."16 By 1922,
however, Lenin instructed his foreign minister Chicherin to engage in
traditional diplomatic activities during the Genoa Conference. The Soviet
Union was socialized by the system, despite its ideologic reasons to oppose it.

Iran illustrated this principle shortly after the end of the monarchy.
Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic chose to dismantle its defense
forces by purging the officer corps. This action nearly" bankrupted" the new
republic as it was perceived vulnerable to its persistent adversary, Iraq and
threatened with extinction. This invasion quickly socialized the revolutionary
leaders to the realities of the international system. Following the Iraqi
invasion, many military leaders were "rehabilitated." Fighter pilots were

16Waltz, p. 127.

11

literally taken from prison and placed in the cockpit in order to repel the Iraqi

invaders. Iran began to pursue attempts to restore its former military

capabilities, even buying western arms from Israel. While the ideological

rhetoric continued to express the advantages of isolationism, Iran's behavior

clearly indicated its willingness to participate in international politics.

Although the Iranian leadership sought, for ideologic reasons, to pursue

isolationism and reduce the power and influence of the military, the

constraints of the international system forced them to reconsider, or face

extinction.

Chiliastic rulers occasionally come to power. In power, most of them
quickly change their ways. They can refuse to do so and yet hope to
survive, only if they rule countries little affected by the competition of
states. The socialization of nonconformist states proceeds at a pace set by
the extent of their involvement in the system.17

Despite revolutionary Iran's desire to withdraw from the international system,

its involvement in the international system due to its geostrategic location and

importance to both sides of the cold war, coupled with its vast quantities of oil

reserves, virtually guaranteed that it would have to eventually accommodate

itself to this system.

The second aspect of Waltz' definition, the character of the units, is the

one that elicits the most debate. In developing his theory of structural

realism, Waltz specifically excludes the internal attributes of the units in order

to examine structural effects on state behavior in international system. In this

,7Waltz, p. 128.

12

system, major states are the most important actors, thus states are the logical
level of analysis. States establish the rules bv which non-state actors interact in
the international realm, "whether by passively permitting informal rules to
develop or by actively intervening to change the rules that no longer suit
them."18 Although they are not the only international actors, states are clearly
the most important and the most durable.

In domestic political structures, institutions are differentiated not only
by their position in the hierarchy, but more importantly, by the functions that
they perform. The legislature enacts laws, the executive administers and the
judiciary interprets and adjudicates the law. While it is true that roles may
overlap and certain institutions may attempt to usurp the powers of others, the
individual roles of the institutions are differentiated by the central authority,
with procedures defined to clarify conflicts. In contrast, in the anarchic
international system, each state must perform the same function. Each state is
sovereign political entity, duplicating the functions of the other states. Each
state must decide how it will raise revenues, defend itself, enact and execute
legislation and provide for the needs of its citizens. No international
organization dictates the particular methods that a particular state must use to
fulfill these functions. Although the structure of the international system
imposes constraints on the prospects for success of a particular strategy, each
state is still free to decide how it will cope with its internal and external

18Waltz, p. 94.

13

challenges. Although states vary widely in size, wealth, geography, ideology

and power, they are alike in the tasks they face and the ends they aspire to.

[Domestic] politics consists of differentiated units performing specified
functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one
another's activities.19

By eliminating internal attributes from his model, Waltz can determine systemic

influence on state behavior in international politics.

The behavior of states in the international realm are strikingly similar,

the differences arise chiefly from differences in Waltz' third defining attribute,

the distribution of capabilities. Using the distribution of capabilities among the

units as an attribute of the international system may seem to contradict Waltz'

assertion that the attributes of the units do not affect the international

structure. It does not. Waltz contends that:

although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities
across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute,
but rather a system wide concept.20

An individual state's capabilities does not effect the system, it is the

distribution of capabilities that matters; whether one, two or more states attain

great power status. Students of international politics have long recognized the

important role that capability plays and have defined historical eras by the

great powers that have dominated them. Capability refers not only to military,

but to political and economic power as well.

19Waltz, p. 97.
20Waltz, p. 98.

14

By defining the system by the distribution of capabilities of the units, a
positional picture emerges. This distribution of capabilities determines the
type of international system that will develop. With three or more great
powers, a multi-polar system will prevail. Relations, alliances, between these
states do not matter, if four great powers form two opposing alliances, the
world does not become bipolar, the system remains multi-polar. A bipolar
system will only result if only two nations attain great power status.

These different systems emerge due to structural pressures to create a
balance of power. Waltz' balance of power theory assumes that states are
unitary actors who, as noted above, seek self preservation. Whenever a
powerful state emerges, it threatens the security of the other states in the
system who will then act to balance that threat. States will use all available
means, both internal and external to achieve these ends. In a multipolar
world, states can align and realign in order to maintain a balance of power. In
a bipolar world, although alignment has less impact, states still engage in
balancing behavior, emphasizing internal efforts to increase military strength
or economic capability. A balance of power will occur even though no state is
working to achieve or maintain this balance. "Balance-of-power politics prevail
wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic
and that it be populated by units wishing to survive."21

21Waltz,p. 121.

15

While the international balance of power between the two superpowers
dominated international politics for nearly five decades, regional actors also
had to contend with the regional distribution of capabilities. With the
withdrawal of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf, the Shah perceived an
opportunity to expand Iran's regional influence. This expansion naturally led
to increased tension with some of the other regional actors, chiefly Iraq. Iraq
perceived that revolutionary Iran had seriously reduced its ability to defend
itself from external aggression by purging its army and isolating itself from the
international system. This perception of an imbalance in the regional
distribution of power led to the destructive Iraqi invasion and eight brutal
years of war. Great power politics also influenced these events, however, as
the U.S. supported the Shah's ambitions as a check on possible expanded
Soviet regional Influence, while the Soviets continued to support their ally,
Iraq. In the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviets provided arms to the Islamic Republic
as long as it was on the defensive, then it reverted to supporting Iraq. U.S.
presence in the Gulf increased dramatically in order to balance the increased
Soviet influence gained by it's agreement to lease tankers to Kuwait.

Waltz, then, has defined the structure of the international system by two
attributes, the ordering principle and the distribution of capabilities. Structural
changes will occur only if there is a change in the ordering principle. If a
hierarchic system develops, this will be a structural change. Systemic changes,
on the other hand, will occur if there is a change in the distribution of

16

capabilities. The emergence of a bipolar world after World War II was a

systemic change, as was the end of bipolarity with the fall of the Soviet Union.

Each of these systems imposes particular set of constraints on the behavior of

states in the international arena. This bipolar system, characterized as "the

long peace"22 endured from the end of World War II until the fall of the Berlin

Wall in 1989. This single international system encompassed virtually the entire

reign of Mohammed Reza Shah as well as first decade of the Islamic Republic.

Waltz has defined structural realism as sparsely as possible, eliminating

all internal attributes of nations and relations between nations, in order to

determine the role structural forces play in international politics.

In defining international-political structures we take states with
whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires and forms of government
they may have. We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or
legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. .We ask
what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order
that prevails among them and at the distribution of capabilities within that
order.23

While not a theory of foreign policy, it is possible to draw some

expectations from the post-revolutionary regime, based upon Waltz' theory of

international politics. The establishment of the Islamic Republic did not

change the nature of the international system, thus the new regime still faced

similar constraints in its foreign policy. This type of structural analysis would

22John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold
War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

^Waltz, p. 99.

17

expect that several important themes would continue to be present in post-
revolutionary Iranian foreign policy. The Islamic Republic would continue to
be concerned with Superpower interference in its internal affairs, it would
respond to armed invasion by improving the readiness of its armed forces,
obtaining arms from available sources in the international market, that it
would continue to exploit divisive elements in its adversaries in an attempt to
undermine the forces arrayed against it, that it would continue to ally with
those states that shared common foreign policy goals, and finally, that despite
its rhetoric, that Islamic Iran would become socialized to the international
system.

Waltz' critics argue that international politics cannot be explained by the
constraints of the international system, that understanding the nature of
domestic politics is fundamental to understanding a state's foreign policy
formulation: "to understand Iranian foreign policy one must pay close attention
to the domestic sources of foreign policy behavior."24 Graham Allison's
landmark publication of Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,
provides a theory to explain the different factors influencing the domestic
sources of foreign policy behavior.

B. DECISION MAKING PROCESS

24Farhad Kazemi, "All Politics is Local", in Iran 's Strategic Intentions and
Capabilities, ed. by Patrick Clawson, (Washington D.C.: Institute for National
Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 49.

18

Graham Allison seeks to explain the basis for the policy decisions made
by the Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis through an
understanding of the decision making process. He constructs three different
models and compares their ability to accurately explain the policies that the
administration ultimately enacted. These three models depend on their
different levels of analysis. The three models are: the rational actor, the
organizational process and the governmental politics paradigms.

The rational actor paradigm is derived from classical theories of
economics. In this model, the state is conceived as an individual rational
being, the value maximizer of economics theory. Strategic goals are developed
to ensure the state's national security and national interest. Various course of
action are explored and the consequences of these options are considered. The
costs and benefits of each policy option are ranked and decision making is
simplified as the choice which yields the highest value for the lowest possible
cost. This model presupposes intent. If a state takes a particular action, it is
assumed to be pursuing a rational goal. The problem for the scholar
attempting to explain foreign policy under this model is to determine the
"purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be located as a value-
maximizing means."25 Explanations of foreign policy decisions, then/are
dependent on an understanding of the state's relevant values and objectives,
perceived courses of actions, estimates of the consequences of these actions

25 Allison, p. 33.

19

and its valuation of these consequences.26 This model makes intuitive sense

and has served as the implicit basis for understanding foreign policy

formulation, even prior to its explicit expression. Allison contends that it fails

to adequately explain foreign policy formulation, in part due to its flexibility.

It must be noted, however, that an imaginative analyst can construct an
account of value-maximizing choice for any action or set of actions
performed by a government. Putting the point more formally, if somewhat
facetiously, we can state a "Rationality Theorem": there exists no pattern of
activity for which an imaginative analyst cannot write a large number of
objective functions such that the pattern of activity maximizes each
function.27

On the surface, Allison seems to have defined decision making in this

model as a purely rational process. Understanding this process is dependent,

however, on understanding the internal attributes of the individual nation.

Thus we can see how Model I emphasizes, on the one hand, the
problem and context that create incentives and pressures for a government
to choose a particular course of action, and, on the other, the national (or
governmental) values and axioms that create propensities to respond in
certain ways. ..Were one ignorant, for example, of the differences between
American national attitudes in the mid-1960s and those in the mid-1930s, he
would miss fundamental factors in the foreign policy of the United States.28

While the decision making process consists of maximizing the value for the
minimum cost, one must understand the what influences the nation to place
more value on one alternative over another.

26Allison, p. 34.
27Allison, p. 35.
28 Allison, p. 257-258 emphasis added.

The rational actor model provides a plausible explanation for the U.S.
decision to establish a quarantine around Cuba and the Soviet Union's
subsequent decision to back down, but this model fails to adequately explain
the manner in which the Soviets attempted to install missiles in Cuba in the
first place. While the decision to deploy missiles to Cuba may have resulted in
a strategic foreign policy coup if executed undetected, the method in which it
was implemented virtually guaranteed that the missiles would be discovered
prior to reaching full operational capability. To explore this issue, Allison
turns to his second model.

Under the organizational process model, policy makers are constrained
in the outcomes they can choose by the organizations which will be called
upon to implement their decisions. While the leaders can have a limited effect
on the outcome and can combine different outcomes for a specific result,
established organizational procedures determine the specific content of the
outcome. The organizations provide information, analysis and alternative
courses of action to the decision makers. By presenting only the options that it
views as favorable, the organization seriously limits the choices available to
policy makers. In a crisis situation, leaders are further constrained by the
organizational capabilities that are immediately available.

In understanding foreign policy formulation under the organizational
process paradigm, one must look not only at desired outcomes, but at the
interaction of organizations which are assigned to develop and implement the

21

decision. The government is not a monolithic body with a single focus, but
rather a "constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which
government leaders sit"29 Each of these allies has parochial interests which it
may pursue at the even at the expense of good policy. While the policy
makers are limited by the capabilities and interests of the organizations, these
organizations are limited by their standard operating procedures and
alternatives which have been previously foreseen and prepared. The best way
to predict for how an organization will react in a situation is to examine how
what options it favored in previous, similar situations. This model's
explanatory power is achieved by uncovering organizational routines that
produce a given output.

Allison's third model focuses on the political elite, the leaders of the
various organizations that influence foreign policy formulation. Each of these
leaders has his own power base and different conceptions of personal,
organizational and national goals. Each of these individuals is engaged in a
central competitive game of politics. The bargaining that occurs during this
game often produces outcomes distinct from what any member or group
intended, "...players who make government decisions not by a single, rational
choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."3

i30

^Allison, p. 80.
30 Allison, p. 144.

22

Under this model, it is important to determine who the important
players are, what determines how they stand on an issue and how much
influence they wield. Most of the players in the national security policy game
occupy positions as leaders of agencies that enact or implement policy, i.e.,
State or Defense departments, Director of the CIA or NSA. Others with
important ties to the National Command Authority enjoy status and influence
in excess of that expected from their organizational role. Determination of an
individuals stand can often be understood by examination of the goals and
interests of the organization that he is affiliated to. "Where you stand depends
on where you sit".31 Relative influence is determined by the individual's
personal power. Power is a blend of personal political skills, formal and
informal authority, and the other player's perception of these attributes. To
understand why a policy was adopted under this model it is necessary to
"identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and
compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion."32

For Allison the key to understanding foreign policy development is by
understanding the process. All three of his models are dependent on the
internal attributes of states. The rational actor model depends on the states
relevant values and objectives. The organizational process is dependent on an
understanding of the interests, goals and routines of the organizations which

31 Allison, p. 176.
32Allison, p. 146.

23

enact or implement foreign policy. The governmental politics model is
dependent on the individual strengths and weakness of the various players in
the national security game.

All three of Allison's models would predict substantial change between
Pahlavi and Islamic Iran. The ideology, which affects the relevant values and
objectives of a state changed; the organizations which developed foreign policy
alternatives changed and new organizations were developed which paralleled
the official ones and often performed the same or competing tasks; all of the
important players changed, many times, in the course of the consolidation of
power in the Islamic Republic. This radical change in domestic political
structure would lead Allison to expect radical change in the conduct of foreign
policy.

C. CONCLUSION

In order to determine systemic effects. Waltz assumes that the
international system is made up of states that are like units. He does not deny
that these states are different in many of their internal attributes, only that
these differences are insignificant, that systemic factors are decisive in
determining state behavior in international relations. Many of Waltz' critics
argue that the attributes of the individual states are vital to understanding the
pattern of relations between states and that systemic influences are of less
significance than internal attributes, including ideology , domestic politics and

24

the influence of the political elite on the decision making process that occurs
during foreign policy formulation. Iran provides a unique opportunity to
compare the expectations of the structuralists and the state level theorists.
Following the 1979 revolution, virtually all of the internal attributes which
theorists argue are important in foreign policy formulation changed radically.
State level theorists, then, would expect a very radical change in the nature
and the substance of Iranian foreign policy. The international system remained
the same for the first decade of the new regime. Structuralists would expect
that following an initial series of perturbations, the new regime would become
socialized to the international system and engage in behavior very similar to
that of the Pahlavi regime. The following sections compare the internal
attributes, the ideology, the political elite and the nature of the political
struggle between the institutions of the Pahlavi regime with that of the Islamic
Republic. This comparison of the internal attributes is followed by an analysis
of the foreign policy outcomes that these two very different regimes produced.

25

III. INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF PAHLAVI IRAN

The attributes that state level theorists argue are decisive in formulating
foreign policy include: domestic politics, the composition of the political
leadership and elite, and finally, the regime's ideology. This chapter will
examine these internal attributes under the Pahlavi regime in order to provide
a comparison with the internal attributes of the Islamic Republic which
supplanted it. I will show that by the mid 1970s, the Shah personally
dominated all aspects of these internal attributes, and that his fall led to a
radical change in the nature of these factors.

A. DOMESTIC POLITICS

While the early years of Mohammed Reza Shah's reign were marked by
a power struggle between the Majlis, the government33 and the monarch, by
the early 1960s the Shah had emerged as the undisputed leader in Iranian
politics. He continued to solidify his grip on the reigns of power, allowing
only two political parties, the Mellioun and the Mardom. These parties, which
were officially regarded as a pro-government party and a loyal opposition
party, were unofficially known as the "yes party" and the "yes sir party."34

^by government, I refer to the Prime minister and his cabinet, including, of
course, the Foreign Minister.

^Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (Princeton: Princeton

(continued...)

26

Both of these parties were led by courtiers known for their loyalty to the Shah.
Additionally provincial governors used the local police forces and the
gendarmerie to closely supervise the parliamentary elections.

Despite this control, the Majlis elected in the fall of 1960 opposed the
domestic reforms envisioned by the Shah. Exercising his constitutional rights,
the Shah dissolved both the Senate and the Majlis and called for new elections.
The elections took place in early 1961. This new parliament differed only
slightly from the previous one and it too was dissolved. The Shah then ruled
by firman (royal decree) for the next two years. He appointed Asadollah Alam,
the leader of the yes sir party, as prime minister who was responsible for
implementing the reforms of the Shah's White Revolution. Alam was
responsible for the repression of the clergy which eventually sent Ayatollah
Khomeini into exile. With opposition cowed, elections were allowed to
proceed in 1963. In order to legitimize his actions, the Shah submitted the
reforms of his White Revolution to a referendum. Support for this referendum
is said to have exceeded 99%. Additionally, the Shah submitted all of the
firmans issued in the absence of the parliament to the new Majlis for
ratification. Through these measures, the Shah was able to claim at least the
illusion of popular support for his measures. Following the White Revolution,

(...continued)

University Press, 1982), p. 420.

27

the Shah felt it necessary to eliminate the pro-government Mellioun party and
replace it with the New Iran party, which was then able to reflect the new
reformist attitude of the same old regime. While these parties did elect
members to parliament, they did not really reflect political power in Iran. "By
the early 1970s a serious student of Iranian politics could not attach much
importance to the Mellioun and Mardom parties; the central point in his
studies should have been the administrative and decision-making process in
the Iranian government under the Shah's supreme authority."35

The Shah's control of the political parties and Majlis elections in the
1960s marked the end of significant Majlis influence in domestic politics. This
same era saw also saw the end of the role of the prime minister as the head of
the government. In 1965, the Shah appointed Amir Abbas Hoveyda as prime
minister, who continued to serve until 1977, by far the longest tenure of any
prime minister in modern history. Hoveyda was successful at controlling the
pro-government New Iran party, but was less successful in influencing policy
formulation. The role of the prime minister had changed from that of crafting
policy to one of interpreting and enacting the wishes of the Shah. Hoveyda's
longevity was due to his ability to carry out the Shah's wishes without
threatening his power. "His principle asset was his acceptance of this
subservient role, an astute interpretation of what the Shah wanted and a canny

35Lenczowski, p. 452.

28

feel for the political mood of the country. "36 Hoveyda was considered by his
rival, Assadollah Alam, Minister of Court, as a drunken fool who lacked the
Shah's confidence or the courage to perform his role as Prime Minister.
Indeed, Hoveyda played such a small role in the Iranian foreign policy that he
was free to accompany the Empress on a sight seeing trip to Europe during
the height of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.37

Despite his nearly complete control of both the Majlis and the
government, the Shah continued his efforts to dominate domestic politics. In
1975, he eliminated both the Mardom and the New Iranian parties, replacing
both with the Resurgence party. The goal of this change was to create a Soviet
style, totalitarian, one party state. The Resurgence party created a Central
Committee and elected Hoveyda as the Secretary General of its Politburo.
Nearly all members of the Majlis became members of the new party which
significantly expanded state control of society. "The growth of the Resurgence
party had two major repercussions: the intensification of state control over the
salaried middle class, the urban working class, and the rural masses; and, for
the first time in Iranian history, the systematic penetration of the state into the
propertied middle class, especially the bazaars and the religious

36Robert Graham, Iran, the Illusion of Power, (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1978),p.l31.

37Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I, the Confidential Diary of Iran 's Royal Court,
1969-1977, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), p. 100, 283, 329,

29

establishment."38 By the mid 1970s, the Shah had cowed the competing

institutions and was clearly in control all facets of domestic politics.

As the dominant force in policy making in Iran, the Shah personally

directed the activities of his government. Marvin Zonis' empirical study on the

political elite in Iran documents the divide and rule strategy that Mohammed

Reza Shah employed to control the process.39 By controlling appointment to

key positions and utilizing parallel organizations to provide information and

enact policy, the Shah was able to control the process as well as the substance

of Iranian foreign policy. According to William Griffith, "The Shah is Iranian

foreign policy, has been so since 1953, and will in all likelihood remain so as

long as he reigns."40 The translator and editor of Alam's diaries concurs:

Always keen to control foreign policy, from the late 1950s the Shah's
interventions became increasingly frequent until he, not the government,
became sole arbiter in diplomatic affairs. In the spring of 1969, for
example, Iran came close to war with Iraq, yet the Shah notified his Prime
Minister and the national defense council of these development only after
the army ha d been fully mobilized.41

^8

Abrahamian, p. 442.

39Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1971), p.80-113.

40William E. Griffith, "Iran's Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era", in Iran
Under the Pahlavis, ed by George Lenczowski, (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1978), p. 385.

41Alinaghi Alikhani, "Introduction" in Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I, the
Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977, (New York: St. Martins Press,
1991), p. 14.

30

Alam himself notes many occasions where the Shah personally conducts
diplomacy, or prevents the traditional ministers and bureaucracy from doing
so.42 Alam also noted the bureaucratic inefficiency that resulted from the
Shah's personal interference in the conduct of affairs: "Every minister and high
official direct from His Imperial Majesty and the result is that individual
details often fail to mesh with any overall framework. ..Occasionally one set of
instructions contradicts another..."43

As his reign drew to an end, the Shah dominated domestic politics.
Having risen from one who "cut little ice in Iranian politics"44 to the supreme
ruler of his country, the Shah overcame the persistent efforts of the competing
interests of the government and the Majlis in foreign policy formulation. The
overthrow of the Shah ended his personalized vision of foreign affairs.

B. THE POLITICAL ELITE

Mohammed Reza Shah sat at the pinnacle of power in Pahlavi Iran and
controlled entry into the political elite by his control of access to patronage and
education. Beneath the Shah in this elite hierarchy, were the 63 members of
the royal family and the wealthy aristocrats and entrepreneurs.

42See for example Alam, p. 102, the Shah directs arms procurement, p. 155
diplomatic overtures to Kuwait, p. 357-8, forbidding Foreign Minister from
contacting the Prime Minister.

^Alam, p. 190.

^Alikhani, p. 3.

31

Traditionally, the political elite of Iran consisted of the wealthy-
landowners. While wealth continued to plav an important role in determining
elite status under Mohammed Reza Shah, the importance of land ownership
was reduced by his land reform measures of early 1960s. While some
contend that "land reform has weakened and alienated a considerable part of
the Shah's traditional allies: the landlords."45, Zonis argued that the loss of this
base of support was unimportant to the Shah. While land reform removed one
traditional source of elite wealth, access to opportunities to invest in the
rapidly expanding manufacturing sector, as well as access to sources of
patronage, more than made up for the loss of agricultural income. Access to
these sources of wealth were controlled by the regime. Membership in the
political elite was thus more subject to regime control than previously, when it
relied on land ownership. By the mid 1970s the upper class of Iran consisted
of approximately 1000 families which not only still owned a substantial
amount of large commercial farms, but 85 percent of the major private
manufacturing, foreign trade and financial firms.46

A secondary base for access to elite membership in Pahlavi Iran, was
education. This source of political elite was also subject to regime control.
While traditionally, Iranian education was conducted by the religious sector, a

45Hossein Mahdavy, "The Coming Crisis in Iran," Foreign Affairs, Oct 1965,
p. 142, quoted in Zonis, p. 27.

46Abrahamian, p. 432.

32

large modern educational sector under the control of the ministry of education
was established under Reza Shah and expanded during the reign of his son.
By 1946, the last time a census of traditional schools was reported, less than
ten percent of the students attended the traditional religious schools.47 The
regime deliberately limited access to university education to "students 'who
had the most at stake' in maintaining the present system."48 The political elite
of the 1950s were thus able to ensure the continued elite status of their
children through access to educational opportunities at home and abroad.
Through regime control of these elite power bases, Mohammed Reza Shah
sought to maintain support for his reign.

C IDEOLOGY

Two themes dominate the ideology of Mohammed Reza Shah,
nationalism and modernization. The nationalist trend permeated the Shah's
foreign policy efforts to assert Iranian independence. Even his alignment with
the west was a result of his perception that Iran was not strong enough to
maintain its own sovereignty in the face of Soviet expansionism. While some
scholars extol the virtues of Mossadegh's nationalist efforts, Lenczowski argues
that "It was the Shah's regime that was par excellence a nationalist one because
the Shah tried to safeguard Iran's independence and integrity against what he

47Zonis, p. 34.
^Zonis, p. 37.

33

saw as a greater danger, namely the very real threat of Soviet imperialism
rather than the imaginary threat of American or British imperialism."49 Even in
his western orientation, the Shah continued to exercise limited independence
from the U.S., making initiatives to the Soviets when it served Iranian
interests, as in his purchase of $100 million of Soviet arms in 1967.

Modernization was also a key element in the Shah's strategy, indeed, he
was almost obsessed with it. "Today we have far to go to catch up, and it is
not merely enough to 'catch up'. ..we also need to adapt." "My father was
never satisfied with the pace of modernization and neither am I."30 This
obsession increased following the dramatic rise in oil prices in the early 1970s.
Some theorists, especially the Shah's supporters, have argued that it was the
pace of modernization that ultimately led to the revolution which ended his
reign.51 Through modernization, the Shah hoped to achieve a "Great
Civilization" which would "have meant that Iran had become a prosperous
industrialized and welfare state, and a formidable world economic and
military power in its own right..."52

49Lenczowski, p. 469.

50Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, (London:
Hutchinson of London, p. 1960), p. 132 & 139.

51Abrahamian, p. 426.

52Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1980), p. 137.

34

D. CONCLUSION

The competition between the institutions of the government, the Majlis
and the Shah ended in a victory for the Shah, who completely dominated
domestic politics by the mid 1970s. This dominance also extended to the
political elite which the Shah influenced through his control of access to
patronage and education. The regime's ideology was based on the Shah's
unique personal blend of nationalization and modernization. The Shah's
pervasive influence over every facet of the internal attributes of Iran would
lead state level theorists to expect very different behavior from the
revolutionary regime which violently overthrew the ailing monarch.

35

IV. INTERNAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

The government of the Islamic Republic was a radical departure from
the government of Mohammed Reza Shah. All of the internal attributes that
state level theorists argue are decisive in formulating foreign policy changed;
the domestic politics changed, the political leadership changed and the
regime's ideology changed. This chapter examines these internal characteristics
of Khomeini's regime in order to contrast these attributes with those of the
Shah.

A. DOMESTIC POLITICS

Mohammed Reza Shah was deposed when his opponents, reflecting the
full spectrum of political beliefs and social classes, united in a coalition to end
reign of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini emerged
as the only political figure with a national following. His quest to establish his
version of an Islamic Republic dominated domestic politics in Iran until his
death in 1989. Competition between the various governmental and extra-
governmental institutions, spawned by the revolution, inhibited the effective
formulation of policy in the new regime. According to the state level theorists,
the strife that characterized domestic politics following the establishment of the
Islamic Republic should have played an important role in the foreign policy of
the new regime.

36

1 . The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Iran.

Following his return to Iran, Khomeini quickly demonstrated his
supreme authority by appointing Mehdi Bazargan as the Prime Minister of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of Iran (PRG). With the dissolution of
the Majlis, Bazargan and his cabinet represented the only legitimate branch of
government. Bazargan's government was made up of politicians who had
actively opposed the Shah. Clerics and members of the Tudeh party were
conspicuous by their absence from this first attempt to govern the new
republic.53

Bazargan was a nationalist, formerly a member of the National

Front. In foreign policy he preferred a moderate non-alignment policy very

similar to that of his former colleague, Mossadegh. This policy would avoid

dependence on great powers while maintaining good relations with all states,

especially in the developing world. Although concerned about the pervasive

negative influence of the U.S., Bazargan was more fearful of the Soviet threat:

Like most Iranian nationalists of both secular and Islamic variety,
however, Bazargan and his colleagues were apprehensive about the Soviet
Union, given its proximity. They wanted to maintain good relations with
the West to balance Soviet power.54

^David Menashri, Iran, a Decade of Revolution, (New York and London:
Holmes and Meier, 1990), p. 78, see also Shaul Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs,
Iran and the Islamic Revolution, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1986), p. 54.

"Hunter, p. 109.

37

While Bazargan's PRG represented the only "legitimate" source of

political power in Iran, real power, however, was dispersed between many

extra-governmental institutions. The Revolutionary Council was established

prior to the Shah's abdication, and was intended as a transition team to effect a

smooth transfer between the former and the revolutionary regime. This

council remained in place following the establishment of Bazargan's

Provisional Government and acted as a secret "supergovernment" running

parallel agencies of its own. The Revolutionary Council engaged in its own

foreign policy, instructing the Iranian ambassador to the U.S. to conduct

certain negotiations without notifying the Foreign Ministry.55 The two

institutions had contradicting foreign policy goals. While Bazargan wished to

conduct traditional diplomacy, the Revolutionary Council was committed to

withdrawing from the international system:

Bazargan wanted envoys skilled in diplomacy or, at a minimum,
seasoned in politics and international affairs. The Revolutionary Council,
however, preferred ideologues who were prepared, if necessary, to defy
international convention.56

The Revolutionary Council was not the only institution

interfering in the attempts of the PRG to govern Iran. Komitehs, the

revolutionary committees that sprang up in virtually every city, town, industry

and district, were instrumental in organizing collective action against the Shah

55Menashri, p. 82.

56Robin Wright, In the Name of God, The Khomeini Decade, (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1989), p. 67.

38

during the revolution. With the fall of the Shah, thousands of small arms fell
into the hands of the komitehs which served as local security forces and agents
of the revolution, prison guards and executioners.37 Many of the komitehs were
subordinate and loyal to local clerics and political leaders. In Tehran alone,
there were an estimated 1,500 komitehs in 1979. Gaining control of these
autonomous agencies preoccupied the Bazargan government for the duration
o( its reign. The Provisional Government never presented a serious threat to
the power of these institutions.

In an attempt to gain control over the komitehs and as a counter
to the regular armed forces, whose loyalty was unproven, Khomeini
established the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) in May, 1979. The Pasdaran
was under control of the Revolutionary Council and often worked counter to
the efforts of the PRG. The Pasdaran was often employed to suppress domestic
opposition in regions where the regular army was reluctant to engage the
"enemy". The Pasdaran was instrumental in subduing the Kurdish and Arab
revolts.38

The fear of a counter-revolution and the desire to punish
member's of the Shah's repressive regime led to the establishment of a system
of Revolutionary Courts. These courts had the cooperation of the komitehs and
the Revolutionary Guards. Like the other revolutionary extra-governmental

57Bakhash, p. 56-57.
58Menashri, p. 90-92.

39

institutions, the Revolutionary Courts were independent of government and
even the Revolutionary Council. The first courts were established in Tehran,
but were quickly copied in the other major cities. While these courts were
certainly effective at eliminating members of the former regime, they
obstructed the progress of the governments reconstruction efforts. Bazargan
attempted to assume the authority of these courts by establishing a counter-
revolutionary court system under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The
government passed these measures but the Revolutionary Courts refused to
abdicate their role as long as they maintained Khomeini's confidence. While
Bazargan was successful in obtaining the Imam's support in reducing the
jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts, he lacked the means to enforce these
limits.59 The courts continued dispensing their version of Islamic justice long
after the fall of the PRG.

As noted above, Khomeini was the supreme authority appointing
Bazargan to head the PRG and creating and supporting the various non-
governmental agencies. While he did act as an arbiter between the
government and the extra-governmental institutions, Khomeini was reluctant
to give his unqualified support to either faction. Despite Bazargan's limited
effectiveness and dwindling popular support, Khomeini refused to accept his
resignation on several occasions during his tenure as Prime Minister.

59Bakhash, p. 60.

40

It was a foreign policy initiative that hastened the downfall of the
PRG. On November 1, 1979, Bazargan attended a meeting with Brzezinski in
Algiers to address the future of U.S. -Iranian relations. Despite receiving a
mandate from the Revolutionary Council to conduct the meeting, Bazargan
became the personal target of the public wrath for meeting with the "Great
Satan" while the Shah was admitted to a U.S. hospital for cancer treatment.
Immediately following the ensuing hostage crisis, Khomeini accepted
Bazargan's resignation and appointed the Revolutionary Council to manage
affairs until the establishment of formal government institutions. The winner
of the first round in this competition in domestic politics was clearly the
parallel government as opposed to the "legitimate" government institutions.
2. The Bani-Sadr Presidency.

The hostage crisis that hastened the fall of the Bazargan
government also mobilized support for the rule of clerics in the newly
established republic. One month after the occupation of the U.S. embassy, in a
massive show of support, the country approved the new Constitution,
confirming Khomeini's role as vilyate-e-faqih. The election for the first president
was set for January 25, 1980. Although confirmed by the plebiscite for the
constitution, Khomeini was apparently still reluctant to sanction the dominant
role of the clerics in the new order; Khomeini precluded mullahs from

41

competing in this election.60 Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, a persistent opponent of
the Shah with close personal ties to Khomeini- one of the few to accompany
Khomeini on his triumphant return from exile- won the presidency with over
75% of the popular vote. Bani-Sadr mistakenly believed that this vote gave
him a popular mandate to pursue his program. Like Bazargan, Bani-Sadr was
a westernized nationalist. Born the son of an Ayatollah, his close ties to
Khomeini led him to express a more activist non-aligned party than that of the
PRG, "especially in the service of Islamic causes."61 Bani-Sadr was also more
concerned with the threat of the Soviet Union, whose forces invaded
Afghanistan in the fall of 1979, and thus favored "reasonable" ties with the
west. The competition between Bani-Sadr and first the Revolutionary Council,
and later, prime minister Rajai, constrained the implementation of his views.
Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh reported in May, 1980, that Iran did not have a
foreign policy, complaining that " a certain amount of demagoguery, simple-
mindedness and naivete (in the Revolutionary Council) has totally paralyzed our
foreign policy".62

Khomeini initially supported Bani-Sadr, confirming his election as
president and appointing him the head of the armed forces. Foreshadowing
the coming rivalry, however, the Revolutionary Council prevented Bani-Sadr

60Wright, p. 88.
61Hunter, p. 110.
Menashri, p. 152, original emphasis.

42

62

from establishing his cabinet until the completion of the Majlis elections later
that spring. The clerics were allowed to participate in the parliamentary
elections and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), the bastion of the mullahs,
won the largest number of seats, capturing control of 47% of the Majlis. While
the IRP was clearly the dominant force in the first Majlis, even it was racked
with factionalism and competition.63 The Majlis did, however, present a more
or less united front in the struggle for power it engaged in with the President.
As noted above, the formation of the government provided the initial issue of
debate. Bani-Sadr selected Mostafa Mir-Salim from a list of candidates
approved by the Majlis as his choice for prime minister. Mir-Salim was
opposed by the Revolutionary Guards and the komitehs due to his criticism of
the level of violence utilized in the suppression of a Mojahedine rally. These
institutions compelled the Majlis to block Mir-Salim's confirmation, despite its
earlier support. Bani-Sadr opposed the Majlis choice, Mohammed- Ali Raja'i,
but as the summer drew on, he bowed to the continuing Majlis pressure and
accepted his nomination. The president and the prime minister continued to
struggle for control of the government through the appointment of the
remaining cabinet members. This competition waged from Raja'i's
appointment in August 1980 and was not resolved by the time Bani-Sadr was

63 Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the revolution, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1982.), p. 68-70.

43

removed from the presidency in June 1981. u This power struggle paralyzed
foreign policy formulation as long as Bani-Sadr remained in power.

In addition to competition from the Majlis, the government and
Revolutionary Council, Bani-Sadr had to contend with the Students Following
the Imam's Line (SFIL) who were occupying the American embassy and using
captured documents to discredit government officials who opposed their goals.
Shortly after the occupation of the U.S. embassy, while serving as Foreign
Minister, Bani-Sadr's mission to the U.N. to publicize Iran's grievances against
the U. S. was blocked by opposition factions in the Revolutionary Council.65
His attempts, as president, to pursue a negotiated settlement were blocked
when Khomeini ruled that only the Majlis-yet to be elected- could address the
issue. The SFIL turned the embassy compound into their personal territory,
denying access to government and foreign negotiators. "On a critical issue of
foreign policy, the government had lost its freedom of action."66

The importance of the hostage crisis was rapidly overshadowed
by Saddam Hussein's invasion on 22 September, 1980. The rivalry between the
president and the prime minister was exacerbated by the war. Bani-Sadr was
appointed as the Commander in Chief of the regular armed forces, whose
leadership and readiness were decimated by the post-revolutionary purges.

"Bakhash, p. 105-110.
65Zabih, p. 55.
66Bakhash,p. 114.

44

Nearly 8,000 officers had been dismissed and many units were only 25%
operational.67 The Prime minister and the IRP maintained control of the
revolutionary Guards, which were considered more reliable and had gained
experience in the campaign against the Kurds. The Revolutionary Guards
were often deployed at the rear of the regular forces in order to prevent army
retreat rather than to attack Iraqi forces. Although the president had been
granted broad powers to prosecute the war, the prime minister actively
opposed his efforts and gained control of foreign and domestic policy
formulation. He personally represented Iran at a meeting of the UN Security
Council and prevented Bani-Sadr from sending his representative. He steadily
gained control of the decision making process, implementing government
decrees without the president's approval, blocking presidential appointees
from departing on foreign missions, and seizing the initiative in the hostage
negotiations.68

Bani-Sadr appealed to Khomeini for support in his efforts to seek
the resignation of the government. The faqih refused to take sides in the
dispute instead recommending the creation of a three man commission to
arbitrate affairs between the president and the government. Despite
Khomeini's pleas for the two sides to cease airing their differences publicly,
both parties continued their attacks. As the government moved to restrict his

67Bakhash,p. 114 and 127.
^Bakhash, p. 130.

45

powers, Bani-Sadr continued to demand the dismissal of government. In June,
1981, the three man commission ruled that Bani-Sadr had acted against the
constitution and against the wishes of Khomeini. The clerics successfully-
urged Khomeini to withdraw his support for the president; Bani-Sadr was
dismissed and joined the ranks of the expatriate opposition groups. With the
fall of Bani-Sadr, "both the appearance and the reality of power passed into the
hands of the clerics, who were now free to concentrate on the program of
Islamization and suppression of their enemies to impose their ideology and
perpetuate their rule."69

Presidential elections were scheduled one month after the
dismissal of Bani-Sadr. Of the 71 potential presidential candidates, only the
four candidates which were IRP members were approved by the Council of
Guardians.70 Raja'i was elected and Mohammed Bahonar, co-founder of the
IRP, was confirmed as Prime Minister. This government was short-lived as
both Raja'i and Bahonar perished when a powerful bomb exploded during a
meeting in the prime minister's office. Khomeini abandoned attempts to
exclude clerics from the role of president and supported Ali Khameni'hi's bid
for the presidency.

69Menashri, p. 183.

70The Council of Guardians consisted of six clerics appointed by Khomeini
and six Muslim jurists selected by the Majlis, which was dominated by the
IRP, see Menashri, p. 117, also see note in Wright, p. 101.

46

3. The Consolidation of Clerical Power.

With the election of Khameni'hi, the sole surviving co-founder
and leader oi the IRP, as president, and the appointment of Mir Husayn
Musavi as Prime minister, the clerics were clearly in charge of domestic
politics. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the speaker of the
Majlis and became a powerful political figure in both the Majlis and the IRP.
Ideological differences still occurred, but these differences were confined to
varying interpretations of clerical rule; those opposed to clerical rule were
suppressed.71

The competition for influence continued between the clerics
ruling the Islamic Republic. Echoing the situation prevalent under the Shah,
the competition now focused around the official government institutions.
Following his re-election in 1985, Khameni'hi desired to nominate one of his
own followers to the position of prime minister. Khomeini apparently had
misgivings about Musavi's previous performance and gave him only lukewarm
support; just enough to ensure his nomination and confirmation as prime
minister. The Majlis served as an important forum for debate on the
composition of the cabinet and approved the composition of the government
only after appeals from the Imam that further delay would "harm Islam."7

71See Menashri, p. 223 for a description of the basic difference between the
two main factions in the Majlis: the Maktabi and the Hujjatiyyah.

^Menashri, p. 347.

47

Competition also waged between the Majlis and the Council of
Guardians. In an attempt to fulfill their obligations to the mostazafin, the
oppressed, the Majlis passed legislation redistributing land, creating a
government monopoly on real estate transactions, nationalizing foreign trade,
labor laws and providing for government control of health clinics. The more
conservative Council blocked all of these measures as being contrary to the
principles of Islam.73

Competition for influence also waged within the IRP. President
Khameni'hi and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani became the leaders of the two
factions within the party. While both men continued to express their
friendship and admiration for the other, basic differences in social and
economic policy existed. Generally, Rafsanjani was more pragmatic in his
views of economic and foreign affairs. By 1984, these differences had begun to
impair the functioning of the IRP and had, by 1985, led to deep divisions
within the party. These party rivalries carried over into parliamentary politics.
Three of the most important cabinet posts (oil, interior and foreign affairs)
were held by men loyal to President Khameni'hi who did not cooperate with
the prime minister and impaired the functioning of his government.74

Khomeini took action to resolve the issues surrounding these
power struggles. In response to a June, 1987 letter from both Rafsanjani and

73Wright, p. 172 and Menashri, p. 224.
74Menashri, p. 307-309 and 350-352.

48

Khameni'hi, Ayatollah Khomeini dissolved the IRP stating that the party had
fulfilled its mission to consolidate the institutions of the Islamic Republic, and
thus was no longer necessary.75 While this measure quieted the public debate
by removing the forum for discussion, it did not address the nature of the
differences between the opposing factions.

In late 1987 and early 1988, Khomeini moved to resolve the
power struggle between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. In 1987,
Khomeini urged the Council to approve the Majlis legislation. In February,
1988, he empowered the politicians by ruling that if an impasse between the
two institutions should develop, it could be resolved through a commission
consisting of the six theologians in the council and six leading politicians. A
majority vote of this commission would be binding on both institutions.

Shortly before his death in 1989, Khomeini moved to eliminate
the rivalry between the president and the prime minister. In an effort to
clarify certain constitutional questions, centering mainly around the issue of his
succession, Khomeini sanctioned a commission to study the constitution and
recommend changes. The issues under consideration were: the qualifications
of leadership, the division of executive power and finally, the composition of
the judiciary. This commission would make recommendations which would
be submitted for public approval through a referendum.

75Wright, p. 162.

49

The qualifications of the faqih, according to the 1979 constitution
required candidates for the supreme office to be a source of emulation, a marja-
e-taqlid. In 1989, of the clergy that met this requirement, "none had the
physical strength, personal inclination or political acceptability to become the
supreme religious leader."76 The commission resolved this issue by changing
the requirement so that religious leaders that had the potential to become a
marja-e-taqlid were also eligible to serve as the supreme leader. Through this
action, the constitution enhanced the political aspect of the leader's role and
diminished the religious aspect.

The second issue directly addressed the intra-government
competition between the president and prime minister. The role of the prime
minister was abolished, but the Majlis' ability to check the president's power
was enhanced by making the president subject to questioning by the Majlis. If
the president's response to this questioning was unsatisfactory, the Majlis
would have the right to appeal to the leader to dismiss him. The constitutional
reforms also made the Majlis subject to dissolution by the leader under certain
conditions.

Other constitutional reforms provided for the election of a
mujtahid, "well versed in judiciary affairs"77 as the head of the judicial branch,
the appointment of a vice president and the creation of a Supreme National

76Hunter, p. 25, emphasis added,
^quoted in Hunter, p. 32.

50

Security Council to assist the president in the administration of his
government.

While these reforms served to strengthen the political institutions
of the government of the Islamic republic, thev did not end the competition
between the different factions of the leadership. This competition continued
long after the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic. Despite his efforts
to centralize the government under his personal direction, Khomeini never
succeeded in ending the competition within his regime that dominated
domestic politics during the first decade of the Islamic Republic.

B. POLITICAL ELITE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Much of the leadership that initially supported the revolution were
members of the political elite under the Shah's regime. With the fall of PRG
under Bazargan, many of these former elites fled. "Within one year, almost all
of the revolutionary leaders who could be considered part of the old elite had
been pushed outside the revolution."78 This elite was replaced by a new elite
consisting of clerics and highly religious laymen.

At the pinnacle of political power, of course, was the vilyate-e-faqih,
Ayatollah Khomeini. As the political leader, he appointed the commander in
chief of the army, important elements of the Council of Guardians and the

78Richard Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran", in Iran 's Revolution, the
Search For Consensus, ed. by R.K. Ramazani, (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 4.

51

judiciary, and representatives to virtually any government department. As the
religious leader, Khomeini appointed the Friday prayer leaders in all of the
important cities and towns. "As Khomeini's personal representatives, the
Friday prayer leaders in the major cities often overshadowed the authority of
the provincial governors"79

Elected officials also reflected the emergence of a clerical elite.
Although Khomeini initially opposed the participation of clerics in presidential
elections, he reversed himself following the fall of President Bani-Sadr, which
eventually led to the election of Ayatollah Khameni'hi. Majlis elections were
dominated by the new elite from the start. The election for the first Majlis was
supervised by the Minister of the Interior, headed by an Ayatollah, which
announced that "all candidates 'should believe in Islamic teaching.'"80 These
elections were a clear victory for the clerics as the IRP and members of its
"Grand Coalition" gained control of 130 of the 270 Majlis seats, the largest of
any block in the parliament. The IRP next sought to control the government,
succeeding in imposing its choice for prime minister on the president. Bani-
Sadr was initially successful in blocking IRP control of the cabinet, but with his
fall the new elite was in total control of all branches of government in the
Islamic Republic.

79Bakhash, p. 244.

80 Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, supervisor of the Ministry of Interior, explaining
his overturning of the guidelines previously established by the election law
which would have allowed Marxists candidates. Quoted in Menashri, p. 124.

52

Control of the extra-governmental organizations was almost exclusively
in the hands of the clerics, which , as noted above acted autonomous of
government control. In addition to these extra-governmental revolutionary
organizations which were controlled by the clerics and religious laymen, the
leaders of the traditional bureaucracy were stripped away and these positions
were filled with supporters oi the Islamic Republic, often members of the IRP.
The revolutionary regime thus created a new administrative elite who owed
their advancement to the revolution."81 The wealthy, educated elite of the
Pahlavi regime was quickly replaced by a group of clerical elites that were
fundamentally different in the Islamic Republic.

C IDEOLOGY

The ideological view of the Islamic republic Iran was almost exclusively
formulated by its faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini. In his view, the world is divided
into oppressors and the oppressed. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were
clearly the leading oppressors and divided the world between their capitalist
and socialist views. The world was also divided into "those who follow the
'right path,' the 'path of God and belief and those who follow the 'corrupt
path,' the 'path of Satan and disbelief'"82 This led to Khomeini's support for a
"neither east nor west" policy. This policy exceeded normal tenets of non-

81Bakhash, p. 245.

82Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 37.

53

alignment and deliberately sought international isolation. This isolation was a
goal to be sought, not a sanction to be feared: "We are not frightened by-
isolation; rather, isolation should be welcomed because it forces us to think
about our own affairs... even an economic blockade could only be regarded as
a gift."83

In Khomeini's view, only Iran was non-aligned; only the Islamic
Republic was based on the true faith of Islam. Because of Iran's singular place
in international affairs, Khomeini believed it must assume the responsibility for
exporting its revolution to save oppressed peoples everywhere. Iran attempted
to encourage all third world nations to seek their own independence by
severing ties to the superpowers. Khomeini also sought to promote unity in
the Muslim. This unity could not take place, however, as long as the current
oppressive regimes continued to dominate the Islamic world. This belief led to
support for efforts to export the Islamic Revolution to the neighboring Muslim
countries. There was debate within the government throughout the years as to
means by which this exportation was to occur. Some argued that Iran should
strive to be an example for the oppressed peoples of its neighboring states to
model themselves after, while others argued for a more activist, interventionist
type of revolution export.

This vision of international relations dominated the foreign policy
establishment. Those favoring normal relations with the west departed with

^Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted in Menashri, p. 203.

54

the fall of Bani-Sadr. While earlier, Iranian foreign policy had been paralyzed
by the internal power struggles within the Iranian leadership, after the fall of
Bani-Sadr, Iranian foreign policy was paralyzed by Khomeini's views on
isolationism.

D. CONCLUSION

Following the Islamic revolution in 1979, there was a radical change in
the nature of the internal attributes in Iran. Domestic politics was dominated
by the Shah from the early 1960s until the end of his regime. He controlled the
political party which determined candidates for Majlis elections. He controlled
appointment of the prime minister and the cabinet. Senior military and
ministry officials reported directly to him. He had parallel security
organizations and established a special agency under the control of his
supposedly loyal, personal friend, Fardoust, to monitor the activities of other
agencies.

The political elite in the Pahlavi regime consisted of wealthy, educated
aristocrats and entrepreneurs. The Shah controlled access to this elite through
his control of sources of patronage and entry to advanced education.

Following the downfall of the Shah, domestic politics was dominated by
the struggle to achieve power in the post-revolutionary regime. This struggle
was initially waged between the nationalist and clerical factions of the
Government, between the provisional government and the extra-government

55

revolutionary organizations. With the approval of the Constitution the
struggle shifted to control of the executive branch, with the revolutionary
agencies still causing problems for the administration. Even after the
consolidation of clerical power, factions of the ruling clique were divided over
the role of the private and the public sector. This divisiveness eventually led
to the disintegration of the Islamic Republican Party, a long time bastion of
clerical power. Through all of these struggles, Ayatollah Khomeini served the
role of arbiter, maintaining a balance between these factions and avoiding open
conflict within his regime.

The political elite in the Islamic Republic consisted of clerics and
religious lay people. Entry into the elite was controlled by the clerics' control
of the Council of Guardians which determined the suitability of candidates for
government office and through Khomeini's authority to appoint individuals to
government positions. The ideology changed from the Shah's western oriented
, modernizing nationalism to Khomeini's non-aligned efforts to export the
Islamic revolution and free the oppressed peoples of the world. All of these
attributes, that the state level theorists argue are decisive in the formulation of
foreign policy, changed radically. As noted above, however, the international
system did not change as result of the Islamic revolution. The next section will
examine the conduct of foreign policy in both regimes to demonstrate that
these internal factors had little impact, and that it was systemic forces which
played the decisive role on the actual conduct of Iranian foreign policy.

56

V. FOREIGN POLICY CONDUCT

Despite the very different nature of domestic politics, political elite and
regime ideology, both Pahlavi and Islamic Iran faced a similar international
and regional balances of power. This similar structure imposed similar
constraints on the foreign policy of both regimes. Although the revolutionary
regime which supplanted the Pahlavi regime attempted to withdraw from
international politics, it quickly was socialized by, and became an active
participant in, the international system. This chapter focuses on some of the
issues that the two regimes faced in order illustrate the impact that systemic
and domestic factors have on state behavior in international politics.

A. RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS

The foreign policy of Iran has long been preoccupied with its relations
with the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, R.K. Ramazani defines
the eras of Iranian foreign policy in terms of its relations with the
superpowers. According to Ramazani, the central objective of foreign policy
under the Shah was the pursuit of national autonomy.84 Ramazani defines
autonomy as the optimization of freedom of action in the international system.
While the Shah became committed to serving U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf,

^Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, On the issue of autonomy, see
introduction, p. 10-14, on the use of foreign policy strategies, see ch. I, VIII, XI
and XIII.

57

even these efforts served to expand Iran's regional influence The Shah was
willing to exploit the U.S. preoccupation with the Soviet threat in order to
obtain U.S. aid and arms in pursuit of Iran's regional ambitions. The strategies
that Pahlavi Iran utilized in the pursuit of this national autonomy were clearly
driven by systemic factors. They were: Third Power strategy, Negative
Equilibrium, Positive Nationalism and Independent National Policy. This goal
of national autonomy continued to drive Iranian foreign policy, even after the
revolution.

1. The Monarchy and the Superpowers.

Following World War II, Iran was at the mercy of the occupying
powers and sought to use the U.S. as a third power counter to Soviet and
British influence, much as Reza Shah had attempted to exploit ties to Germany
in the inter-war period. The U.S., committed to rebuilding war torn Europe,
while supportive of the young monarch was not as enthusiastic as Tehran in
developing close ties. Tehran solicited at least $250 million in loans and
grants, while Washington was willing to provide only a tenth of that amount.

The early fifties saw the rise of the contentious issue of oil
nationalization promoted by the charismatic Prime Minister Mohammed
Mossadegh. Mossadegh supported a policy of negative equilibrium to replace
the Shah's efforts to engage the American in his third party strategy. Although
initially sympathetic to Iranian nationalization efforts, as the crisis developed,
the United States sided more and more with Great Britain: "as the East-West

58

cold was developed ... the resultant bipolar international system did not allow
much divergence of approach between the United States and Britain on
matters of common concern...8586 As relations with Great Britain and the west
became more strained and the Iranian economy deteriorated, the threat of a
communist takeover appeared to be real. Mossadegh was unable to play the
off United States against Great Britain so he attempted to play the Soviet
Union off against both western countries. This miscalculation led to the
downfall of the Mossadegh regime and the end of Iran's policy of negative
equilibrium.

Once the Shah returned to power in 1953, the Shah abandoned
Mossadegh's attempts at negative equilibrium and adopted "positive
nationalism" which basically meant a tactical, temporary, alignment with the
west.87 This time the Americans responded and provided an initial $60 million
of emergency aid to Iran's economy and an additional $120 million once the oil
crisis was resolved. The Shah adhered to the Baghdad pact and visibly
supported the Eisenhower doctrine. Although disappointed that the U.S. failed
to participate in the Baghdad pact, Tehran did sign a bilateral executive
agreement with Washington which pledged American economic and military
assistance.

85Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 245-246.
86Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 245-246.
87Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 260.

59

Iranian policy towards the Soviet Union in this period was one of
"resistance if necessary, reconciliation if possible."88 In the mid 1950s, the Shah
visited the Soviet Union and the two nations signed a settlement of their
persistent boundary dispute. The Soviets opposed Iranian efforts to align with
the west and offered to abrogate the nefarious provisions of the 1921
friendship treaty providing for Soviet occupation of Iran in certain conditions,
if Iran would withdraw from the Baghdad Pact.

The changing nature of the international system in the 1960s led
to a change from the policy of alliance with the west to one of "independent
national policy." The Shah viewed the growing detente between The U.S. and
the Soviet Union as "both a danger and an opportunity."89 The Sino-Soviet
split reduced the threat of "monolithic" international communism. The failure
of the U. S. to support CENTO ally Pakistan in its conflict with India and the
growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam reduced the value of America as an ally
against regional and Soviet aggression. As oil revenues increased, Iran became
less dependent on American aid and gained more autonomy in its foreign
affairs. Domestically, the resurgence of the National Front led to calls for a
more non-aligned foreign policy. In the early sixties, the Soviets reduced their
support for the Shah's internal opponents, giving him more latitude in
domestic affairs. The Kennedy administration had been criticizing Iran for the

88Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 291.
89Griffith, p. 375.

60

pursuing a larger military force while neglecting socio-economic development.
These pressures, facilitated by better relations with the Soviets enabled the
Shah to consolidate his power and initiate the White Revolution.

The Shah's "independent national policy has been interpreted as a
major shift in the thrust of his foreign policy. Ramazani argues that this is
exaggerated. As the international system moved from active containment to
detente, the Shah exploited this opportunity to expand Iranian freedom of
action. During his earlier, "positive nationalism" phase, the Shah had clearly
taken advantage of periods of reduced tensions with the Soviets to obtain
concessions. Iran's independent national policy never led its withdrawal from
its alliance with the west.90 The orientation of the Shah's foreign policy did not
change under independent national policy, only some of the details of its
implementation.

The Kennedy administration had fundamentally different view
than the Shah, of the nature of the threat to Iranian security. The Shah was
convinced that the threat derived from the Soviet Union and its support for
regional powers such as Iraq and Nasser's United Arab Republic. Washington
on the other hand, viewed threats to the Pahlavi dynasty as deriving from
internal sources, susceptible to communist subversion due to the lack of
progress in socio-economic reforms. The U.S. suspended its $30 million annual
subsidy of the Iranian budget in 1962.

90Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 31.

61

The 1960s saw the rapid increase in oil revenues and by 1967, the
United states had suspended military and economic aid to Iran. Military aid
became military sales. While the U.S. , as a weapons supplier, retained some
leverage in Tehran, it was much less than it had enjoyed as a provider of
military aid.

Following the Shah's White Revolution, the Johnson
administration demonstrated its approval of the Shah's reforms by approving
a $200 million Iranian military acquisition plan. Despite this high level
support, the pentagon continued to block the sale of advanced technology and
front line fighter aircraft to Iran. This opposition to modern weapons sales
evaporated, however, following Iran's 1967-68 agreement to purchase military
equipment from the Soviet Union, illustrating again, the impact of systemic
factors. The subsequent sale of two squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighters was
financed through the U.S. department of Defense through Import-Export Bank.

The Shah was even more successful in implementing the
modernization of his armed forces following the 1968 announcement of British
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Arguing that it would be "unfair" for
troubled nations to cable Washington for assistance, the Shah proposed
western support for a massive improvement in the capability of the Iranian
armed forces. The Great Britain and the U.S. backed the Iranian buildup as an
alternative to continued British or increased American presence in the region.
Iran was an ideal candidate for implementation of Kissenger's plan to build up

62

"regional superpowers" so U.S. intervention would not be required. Iran
spent $2.5 billion in the first two years of the seventies, "paying cash for eight
squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers... "" The oil boom of 1973 led to
even more military expenditures, with a 47% increase in the military budget
from 1972-1973. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent Arab oil boycott
highlighted the importance of a stable pro-western regime in Tehran. In 1972,
President Nixon removed all barriers to the Shah's purchase of advanced
weapons and announced the U.S. dependence on the Twin Pillars of Iran and
Saudi Arabia to maintain Persian Gulf security.92 The Nixon Doctrine
cemented the military alliance between Iran and the U.S.

The principle component of the Shah's independent national
policy was the temporary end of his estrangement from the Soviet Union.
Normalization of relations occurred after the Soviets accepted Iran's pledge of
no American missile bases on Iranian soil in 1962. An earlier attempt at
rapprochement between the two nations were stalled as a result of the Soviet
Union's refusal, in 1958-1959 to accept Iran's definition of military bases. The
Soviet Union accepted this definition in 1962 for two reasons. At the systemic
level, relations between the superpowers had noticeably warmed since 1958

91Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 369.

92Roger M. Savory, "Religious Dogma and the Economic and Political
Imperatives of Iranian Foreign Policy", in Iran at the Crossroads, Global Relations
in Turbulent Decade, ed. by Miron Rezun, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford:
Wesrview Press, 1990), p. 48.

63

illustrated by signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty in 1962. This easing
of superpower tensions gave the Shah more leeway in his dealings with the
Soviet Union. Additionally, American technological advances had made its
intermediate range nuclear missiles obsolete. The Polaris ballistic missile
submarine system became operational in 1961 and provided "a much better
retaliatory force"93 than the vulnerable land based missiles. Indeed, during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, president Kennedy was distressed to discover that the
U.S. Jupiter missiles had not already been dismantled as directed.94 These
factors enabled Iran to make a no missile pledge and led to Soviet acceptance
of this overture which promoted better relations between the neighbors.

Iran sought better relations with the Soviets in order to obtain
leverage with its increasingly reluctant ally, the U.S. Relations between the
Iran and the U.S. had deteriorated to the point that in 1960 the Christian Science
Monitor reported that the U.S. was "cultivate(ing) the opposition parties there
(Iran) in hope of taking out diplomatic insurance in case of an overthrow of
the present regime."95 As noted above, the Kennedy administration
discouraged military spending in Iran, promoting socioeconomic reforms
instead. Even after initiating the reforms of the White revolution, the U.S. was
reluctant to provide the advanced equipment requested by the Shah until the

93Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 319.

94 Allison, p. 142.

^Christian Science Monitor , January 15, 1960, quoted in Ramazani, Iran's
Foreign Policy, p. 319.

64

1967 agreement to purchase $100 million of Soviet light arms, trucks and anti-
aircraft guns. This, coupled with the withdrawal of the British from the gulf
led to the U.S. decision to grant the Shah access to any western weapon system
that he desired.

The first fruits of the 1962 missile pledge was a new trade
agreement signed in June, 1964, which led to a five year trade agreement
signed in 1965 and renewed again in 1970. Transit trade increased from less
than $100 million to over $1 billion between 1967 and 1975.96 In 1966, Iran
signed the single most important economic agreement with the Soviets which
led to the Soviet construction of Iran's Aryamihr steel mill and a gas pipeline
between the two neighbors. In 1972, Iran and the Soviet Union signed a fifteen
year treaty of economic and technical cooperation. By this time trade had
increased by over 400 percent during the past five years. As with the United
States, cultural and scientific exchanges increased during this phase of relaxed
tensions. While this economic and cultural cooperation flourished, Iran
continued to resist Soviet political pressure to sever its links to the west. The
Soviets targeted Iran's membership in CENTO and Soviet propaganda
highlighted the policy differences between Washington and Tehran. Moscow
hoped that its arms sales to Iran would weaken its links to the U.S., but the
Soviets were constrained in what they could sell to Iran by the regional
balance of power. Iran sought Soviet surface to air missiles to defend

96Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 331.

65

themselves from the advanced aircraft that the Soviets had provided to Iraq
and the United Arab Republic. The interests of these Soviet allies precluded
the sale of these missiles. The Soviet arms sales to Iran failed to drive a wedge
between Iran and its western arms suppliers. Indeed, following this sale
Washington was more willing to provide the levels of advanced arms that the
Shah requested.

A second point of Soviet pressure was its efforts to encourage
Iran to end its economic relation with western oil companies. The Soviets
were aware of the volatility of the oil issue and hoped, with a little bit of
pressure, to exploit this weakness. In 1972, Iraq broke with western oil
interests, nationalized the industry and established the Iraq Petroleum
Company (IPC). The Soviets encouraged Iran to follow this revolutionary
example, asserting that nationalization would hasten Iranian economic
development. In 1973, Iran informed the oil consortium that it would not
renew the 1954 agreement when it was due to expire in 1979, Moscow viewed
this as a victory for its interests. Iran, however, to Moscow's intense
disappointment, remained committed to a continued relationship with the
consortium and signed an agreement in which the consortium would become a
long term purchaser of Iranian oil.

The most intense conflict between the two powers resulted from
the 1968 British decision to end its presence in the Persian Gulf, effective in
1971. Following the British announcement, Tehran declared that Persian Gulf

66

defense responsibilities should be borne by the littoral states. While the
Soviets went on the record supporting this view, they developed close ties
with Tehran's bitter rivals in Baghdad. The Soviets cast themselves as the
champion of the Arab revolutionary cause in the Persian Gulf area, "97 which
put them on a collision course with Iran's Gulf policy. The Soviet support for
the Dhofar rebellion led to armed conflict between the superpower's surrogates
in the Persian Gulf.

Iran had pursued relations with the Soviet Union in part to
obtain greater leverage with its American allies. By the middle of the 1970s,
Iran had achieved all of the goals of its independent national policy: it was
actively participating as the region's policeman in accordance with the Nixon
doctrine, it had a free hand in purchasing whatever western arms it desired
and it was pursuing rapid industrialization and modernization due to the
meteoric rise in oil revenues. The loosening of tensions in the international
system gave Iran the freedom to conduct trade and development projects with
the Soviets, while at the same time acting in the interests of American in the
Persian Gulf.

2. Islamic Iran and the Superpowers.

Ayatollah Khomeini's foreign policy doctrine has frequently been
characterized by the slogan, "neither east nor west," to indicate his intention to
end the domination of superpower influence on Iran and his intention to

'7 Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 349.

67

withdraw from the international system. Varying interpretation of this slogan
by the different factions competing for influence in the revolutionary regime
have impacted the nature of Iran's superpower relations.

Relations between the newly established Islamic Republic and the
United States can initially be described as cautious. While the Bazargan
administration withdrew from CENTO and cancelled the joint Iran-U.S.
executive defense agreement, it attempted to "pursue a nonhostile,
nonalignment policy toward the United States."98 During the February seizure
of the U.S. embassy, the government quickly asserted its authority and
returned the embassy to U.S. control. U.S. support for the Shah was the chief
cause for tension between the former allies; Iranian dependence on the U.S. for
economic and military assistance was the chief cause for restraint these
relations. In February, 1979, the Carter administration, declaring that it would
"honor the will of the Iranian people," extended recognition to the Islamic
Republic and withdrew its recognition of the Shah's government." While Iran
announced its intention to return American F-14 fighters to the U.S., it also
negotiated new contracts for support for these and other advanced American
aircraft. Tensions increased following the U.S. Senate's May condemnation of
the excesses of the revolutionary courts. Relations deteriorated further in May

98Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy, Contending Orientations",
in Iran 's Revolution, the Search for Consensus, ed. by Rouhollah K. Ramazani,
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 51.

"Menashri, p. 97.

68

when the proposed U.S. Ambassador was rejected by Iran; Washington refused
to nominate another candidate. Bazargan, believing that he had the
Revolutionary Council's mandate to pursue relations with the U.S., met with
Brzezinski in Algiers, leading to the end of his Provisional Government.10'
The hostage crisis, which dominated Iranian and American
Foreign policy for the next fourteen months, isolated Iran in the international
community. Both superpowers were hesitant to intervene directly in Iranian
affairs, which initially gave the revolutionarv regime some freedom of action in
its the dealings with the superpowers. The U.S. feared that American
intervention would trigger a Soviet invasion in accordance with the provisions
of the 1921 friendship treaty. The Soviets feared that increased instability in
Iran was lead to direct U.S. involvement. The U.S. quickly froze all Iranian
assets, but maintained diplomatic relations until April, 1980, in an attempt to
pursue a negotiated settlement. The Bani-Sadr administration supported a
negotiated end to the crisis and sought to have custody of the hostages
transferred form the students to the government. Khomeini exercised his
authority and blocked these attempts. The SFIL blocked negotiation efforts
and prevented United Nation's delegations' access to the hostages that had
been arranged by the Bani-Sadr government. The first Majlis oi the new
regime was seated in May and supported an end to the crisis, yet Khomeini

100Bakhash, p. 70.

69

would not side with the government against the students.101 While a motion to
create a committee to address the hostage issue was passed in early-
September, 1980, no action was taken until after the Iraqi invasion of 22
September. Isolated in the international community and under concerted
attack which threatened the Islamic Republic with extinction, Iran ended the
hostage crisis, demonstrating that it was beginning the process of socialization
to the international system.

Despite the end of the crisis, relations with the U.S. did not
improve. The revolutionary regime continued to characterize America as the
enemy and attacked America's alleged support for Iraq, the growing U.S.
presence in the Persian Gulf, America's support for the Israel-Egyptian peace
process and U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, these issues which
represented a clear difference in the two states' national interest were cast in
ideologic terms for the public and Khomeini vowed to fight "the Great Satan
until the absolute annihilation of its interests (in that part of the world)."102
Hunter reports that following the resolution of the hostage crisis, "the essence
of Iranian policy toward the United States became defiance and challenge, and
its principle goal the demonstration of U.S. impotence to stem the rising tide of
Islam."103 The end of the Bani-Sadr presidency and the violence that

101Menashri, p. 150.
102Menashri, p. 205.

103Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World, Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade,

(continued...)

70

characterized this period increased the tension between the U.S. and Iran. Its
vituperative rhetoric toward the U.S. gave the appearance of a pro-Soviet tilt
despite Iran's continued characterization of the Soviet Union as the "lesser
Satan. These factors certainly affected the U.S.-British decision to provide
Tehran with information on Soviet intelligence efforts in Iran obtained from
Soviet defector, senior KGB official Vladimir Kuzichkin.104 Some relations
between Iran and the U.S. continued, however, as Iran attempted to pursue a
financial settlement of its outstanding dispute with the U.S. in accordance with
the Algiers Agreement. It also maintained commercial ties and sought
American arms for use in its struggle against Iraq.

For its part, the U.S. remained officially neutral in the war
between the Persian Gulf adversaries, but gradually began to tilt toward Iraq.
With Iran's success in expelling Iraqi forces from its territory in 1982, the U.S.
removed Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and permitted
financial transactions to resume.105 In response to the 1983 Iraqi initiated
"tanker wars", Iran threatened to close the Straights of Hormuz to all shipping.
The U.S. responded that it would use military force if necessary to maintain
freedom of navigation in the straights. Whether due to U.S. threats or because
its own oil revenues were dependent on traffic through the straights, Iran

(...continued)

(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 59.

104Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 87.

105Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 60.

71

refrained from intervening with tanker traffic at this Persian Gulf chokepoint.
Following the attempted truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, the
Reagan administration designated Iran as a state supporting terrorism and
under "Operation Staunch," banned military sales to Iran in January, 1984.

Despite these tensions, Iranian leaders began to hint that better
relations between Washington and Tehran were possible. In October, 1984,
Khomeini himself declared that "Iran wanted 'relations with all governments'
(with the exception of the United States, Iran and South Africa)."106 Other
Iranian leaders suggested that Khomeini's "open door" might also be open to
the U.S. if it "changed its attitude...".107 As early as 1983, in a message aimed at
the Americans, Rafsanjani had declared that Iran would "recognize any
country that 'honored' the revolution."108 Following Iranian assistance in
resolving the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the Reagan administration pursued
its ill fated arms for hostages initiative.109 While Iran's initial aim in this
venture was obviously to obtain arms for its upcoming Karbala offensive, its
long term goals were renewed relations with Washington, possible cooperation

106quoted in Menashri, p. 363.
107Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, p. 115.

108-

!Wright, p. 134.

109For a discussion of the events of the "Irangate" affair, see Wright, p. 130-
153. and James A. Bill, "The U.S. Overture to Iran, 1985-1986: An Analysis", in
Neither East Nor West, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States, ed. by Nikki
R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski, (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1990), p. 166-179.

72

against Soviet threats and the coordination of both countries' assistance to the
Afghan Mojahadine.110 For both sides the main issue was a political-to
establish a framework for future cooperation.111 While Iran was successful in
obtaining several thousand American anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, the
political bridge between the two nations was never built. Mehdi Hashemi, a
cleric with ties to the Revolutionary Guards who opposed a rapprochement
between Iran and the U.S., leaked details of the arms for hostages initiative to
the press on November 3, the day before the anniversary of the seizure of the
American embassy. While this disclosure terminated the arms for hostages
deal, it failed to bring down Rafsanjani as the previous meeting with
Brzezinski had brought down Bazargan. Indeed, Hashemi was the one
eventually executed for treason. Rafsanjani attempted to maintain the
possibility for future relations, suggesting that closer ties were possible "If your
governments prove to us in practice that they do not engage in treason against
us..."112 The Reagan administration also recognized its continued common
interest with Iran. U.S. public and congressional response, however, precluded
closer ties without a tangible demonstration of Iranian good will. Further
contact between the two nations would have to occur between official

110R.K. Ramazani, "Challenges for U.S. Policy", in Iran 's Revolution, the
Search for Consensus, ed. by R.K. Ramazani, (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 130.

inMenashri, p. 378.

112Wright, p. 153.

73

government representatives, a condition that was not domestically feasible in

Iran.

Following this aborted effort, U.S. tilted even more overtly

toward Iraq in the Persian Gulf struggle. In September, 1986, Kuwait

requested superpower assistance in protect its fleet of oil tankers from Iranian

attacks. While the U.S. was not enthusiastic to expand its participation in the

war, the Soviets agreed to lease three tankers to the small gulf nation. Fearful

of expanded Soviet influence in the region, the U.S. decided to reflag and

provide armed escort for Kuwaiti tankers. In retaliation for missile and mine

attacks on these targets, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms, Iranian naval

units and a mine-laying ship. The United States increased its diplomatic

initiatives in the U.N. to end the war, pressing for the passage of Resolution

598, with the provision for sanctions against the belligerent that rejected the

plan. Iran surprised the U.S. by conditionally accepting the resolution and

calling for an international determination of the aggressor in the conflict.

Following the Air Bus tragedy, Iran officially accepted the terms of the cease

fire. Surprisingly, Iran did not resort to anti- American rhetoric in the wake of

apparent U.S. hostility. The Deputy Foreign Minister exercised restraint and:

called on the United States to end its hostile attitude; denied that Iran
wanted to export its revolution 'with a gun;' reiterated its interest in
regional cooperation for security in the Persian Gulf; complained about
Iraqi sabotage against Iran; and said that Iran could help gain the release of

74

American hostages if the United States ended the difficulties that it had
created for Iran.113

President Bush, in his 1989 inaugural address stated his desire for improved

relations with Iran; Iran reacted favorably, but neither side undertook practical

steps to end the decade long estrangement.

The Islamic revolution and subsequent hostage crisis which

severed relations between Tehran and Washington did not lead to improved

relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow viewed the revolution with mixed

expectations and apprehension. The Soviets feared the turmoil would lead to

direct U.S. intervention and could not believe that Washington would allow

the Shah's loyal regime to be replaced by one that was not "equally responsive

to its interests."114 The Soviets were hopeful however that the Iranian

revolution would eventually lead to a socialist regime in Tehran, noting that

Lenin predicted the use of religion as a protest against the ruling class as a

period of upheaval on the road to the ultimate socialist victory.115 While the

Soviets were initially in support of the hostage crisis.116 As long as Tehran

113Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 71-72.

114Shireen T. Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Post Revolution
Period" in Iran's Revolution, the Search for Consensus, ed. by R.K. Ramazani,
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 87.

115

Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 82.

116Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 83, Hunter reports that the Soviets were
not only pleased with the hostage crisis, but are implicated in the planing and
execution of the takeover itself, arguing that Hojat-el-Islam Khoeiniha was
"Moscow's man".

75

held the hostages, there could not be a rapprochement between Iran and
America. As tensions between Tehran and Washington grew, however, it
feared American intervention to topple the Revolutionaries and install a pro-
American puppet. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Bani-Sadr
administration felt Moscow's fears might be used as a pretext for a Soviet
invasion of Iran in accordance with the 1921 friendship treaty. The Soviet
initially welcomed the fall of Bazargan; Bani-Sadr turned out to be as anxious
of the Soviets as the PRG had been. The fall of Bani-Sadr was an opportunity
for Moscow. The Tudeh continued to support the clerics as they cracked
down on their critics from both the left and the right. As long as Iraq
remained on the offensive, Moscow was willing to provide weapons and
advisors to aid the besieged Islamic Republic. In addition to military aid, the
Soviet-Iran rapprochement of 1981-1982 led to increased trade, economic and
diplomatic initiatives.

This rapprochement was short lived. With the end of the hostage
crisis in January 1981, and thus the international economic embargo, Tehran
was less dependent on Moscow to supply its needs. Once Iran became less
dependent on Soviet aid and trade, it became more critical of the communist
ideology and Soviet policies in neighboring Afghanistan. With expulsion of
Iraqi troops, Moscow was less willing to supply Iran's offensive capabilities
against its Arab ally. The revelation of Soviet espionage in 1983 and the
subsequent purge of the Tudeh party strained relations even further. Despite

76

these tensions, diplomatic relations were never severed between the two
nations.

With the increased U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf,
Iran-Soviet relations improved once again in the summer of 1984. U.S. arms
sales to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi shoot down of an Iranian F-4 led to a joint
Soviet Iranian declaration opposing foreign presence in the gulf. The
diplomatic door which Khomeini opened to foreign nations for the first time in
1984 was opened to the communist nations as well as Europe and the third
world. Diplomatic contacts between the two nations increased and attempts
were initiated to establish joint Soviet-Iranian projects including gas and oil
exploration and shipping and fishing in the Caspian Sea. The failure of the
pro-west factions in Tehran to create a framework for cooperation in the arms
for hostages fiasco increased Soviet influence in Iran. The U.S. tilt toward Iran
led to fears in Tehran that active American intervention was imminent.
Moscow played on these fears as both regimes opposed increased American
influence in the Gulf. Economic and diplomatic relations improved;
agreements were reached on the construction of a trans-Iranian railroad, joint
oil exploration and Caspian shipping projects were finalized, Aeroflot service
to Tehran resumed and joint industrial projects expanded. The Soviets took
Iran's part in the U.N. security council debate on linking rejection of Resolution
598 to economic sanctions. The Soviet Union's decision to lease three tankers

77

to Kuwait and the subsequent Iranian attack on Soviet shipping slowed but
did not interrupt these initiatives.

By late 1987, the international system showed signs of change.
Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to promote closer ties to the west made the Soviet
Union less accepting of the slow pace of cease fire talks with Iran. Continued
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan remained a source of tension between the
two neighbors. Iraqi use of extended range Soviet scuds to bomb Tehran and
other Iranian cities led to even more criticism of Moscow. While Moscow
desired to maintain closer relations with Tehran, it was not willing to risk its
relations with Gulf Arabs or its growing rapprochement with the U.S., whose
support it needed for an end to its Afghanistan debacle.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, all obstacles (except ideological ones) to better relations between
Iran and the Soviet Union were swept away. Moscow pursued closer ties to
Iran as a counter to American influence with the "moderate" gulf Arabs and to
revitalize the Soviet Asian republics.117 Iran pursued ties to the Soviets in
order to influence the nature of the future Afghan regime and to oppose
Saudi- American influence in the Gulf.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States were condemned by
Khomeini's declaration of a "neither east nor west" foreign policy strategy. The
United States was the Great Satan whose imperialism was responsible for a

117Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 94.

78

variety of ills in Iranian society. The Soviet Union was the lesser satan whose
godless communist ideology was abhorrent and whose occupation of Iran's
Muslim neighbor, Afghanistan was clearly unacceptable. Despite these
obstacles, Iran continued to conduct relations with both superpowers, often
counter the influence of the other cold war competitor. Relations with the
lesser satan were the best when the United States was actively supporting the
Iraqi war effort. Relations with the Great Satan were the best when Iran most
needed American arms for its war effort. Despite widespread enmity for the
United States and routine calls for death to America, Iran did not suspend oil
sales to its ideological enemy. In 1987, the U.S. was Iran's largest trading
partner, purchasing in excess of $500 million worth of Iranian oil.118 While
domestic politics played a minor role in influencing the details of Iranian
foreign policy with the superpowers, systemic factors clearly played the
dominant role in the actual behavior of Iran towards these two nations.

B. IRAN'S NEIGHBORS

Iran's relations with its neighbors are more complex than relations with
either of the superpowers, because the international balance of power system
intersects and interacts with regional balance of power politics. The major

118R.K. Ramazani, " Iran's resistance to U.S. Intervention in the Persian
Gulf" in Neither East Nor West, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States, ed.
by Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiof owski, (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1990), p. 47. See also Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy,
Contending Orientations", p. 61.

79

issues facing Iran and its neighbors were the superpower cold war, persistent
border disputes and irredentist claims and finally, the marketing of the
region's most important resource, oil.
1. Israel.

Iran conducted relations with Israel, at times openly, while often
covertly, since shortly after the Jewish homeland was established in 1948.
While the specific character of certain issues was clearly influenced by
domestic politics and regime ideology, the basis for these relations was due to
systemic imperatives. Both states perceived themselves as "under attack from
progressive Arab leaders."119 Nasser overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952
and pledged to oppose the remaining monarchies who were "self-serving tools
of foreign interests"120 Iran was also threatened by the Soviet Union which had
only recently ended its occupation of northern Iran and continued to interfere
in domestic Iranian affairs through its active control of the Tudeh party.
Tensions with Iraq, strained due to disputes over the Shatt-al-Arab river,
increased following the fall of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958; border incidents
continued at varying intensity until after the death of Khomeini in 1989. With
the withdrawal of British forces in 1971, Iran occupied three gulf islands which

n9Robert B. Reppa, Sr., Israel and Iran Bilateral Relations and Effect on the
Indian Ocean Boszn,(New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 97.

120Reppa, p. 92.

80

exacerbated relations with Arab countries, even those far removed from the
Persian Gulf.

Israel was also surrounded by hostile states. Belligerent rhetoric
and constant low level conflict escalated to full scale war during each decade
following the establishment of Israel. The overriding goal of Israeli foreign
policy in its first years of existence was to end the regional isolation
surrounding it. " Whatever its guiding ideology, whatever its domestic
political makeup, an no matter what historical legacy shadowed the minds of
its policy makers, Israel's conduct was motivated by the patently anarchic
nature of the regional and the wider international environment."121

As the Middle East became the focus of the super-power cold
war, Iran and Israel became important components of the U. S. efforts to
oppose perceived Soviet advances in the region. Since U.S. balancing behavior
was targeted against the Soviets, both Israel and Iran became aware that the
U.S. would be of dubious support in a regional conflict. This led both states to
look favorably to the other as a regional ally as a balance to perceived Arab
aggression. While Iranian ideology, political elite and domestic politics
changed drastically following the revolution, the systemic basis for a bilateral
relations continued, especially following the Iraqi invasion. Relations between
the two nations chilled initially, due to Iran's effort to isolate itself from the
international system, but resumed, albeit at a lower level than under the

,21Sobhani, p. 4.

81

monarchy, after the Iraqi attack began the socialization process within the
Islamic Republic.

Ties between Israel and Iran were initially prompted by Iraq's
persecution of its Jewish minority following the establishment of Israel in 1948.
In order to facilitate the evacuation of Iraqi Jews, Israel attempted to cultivate
ties to Iran. The unstable domestic political situation in Iran led Israeli policy
makers to believe that "It was possible to achieve almost anything in Iran
through bribery."122 For its part, Iran was impressed by Israeli military
prowess and economic development. The Shah tended toward recognition of
Israel, but his views were not decisive in foreign policy decisions as the 1940s
turned into the 1950s. The traditional landowners in the Majlis supported de
facto123 ties to Israel, while the clergy and Mossadegh's National Front opposed
these efforts, although for different reasons. Israel provided $240,000 to
generate favorable publicity and in February 1950, Prime Minister Sa'id
announced the establishment of de facto relations. In March, the cabinet
supported this decision and Iran discreetly opened a consulate in Israel. When

122Sobhani, p. 6.

123Sobhani mistakenly refers to the relations between Iran and Israel as "de
jure". Iran conducted de facto relations with Israel, but never elevated them to
de jure

status. See Eric Hoogland, "The policy of the Reagan Administration Toward
Iran", in Neither East Nor West, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States, ed.
by Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1990), p. 186 and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf,
Iran 's Role, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), p. 37.

82

Mossadegh came to power in 1952, he closed the consulate but never formally
ended relations with Israel, despite the favorable response from the Arab
nations. The Shah's return in 1953 was a victory for the royalist forces, society
however was still divided along religious/secular lines. The weak central
government was constrained by these domestic factors from pursuing a more
aggressive alliance with Israel.124 The alliance continued, but relations
remained discreet.

The 1950s experienced not only the consolidation of royal power,
but also the intensification of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. and the Iran- Arab cold wars.
These events combined to increase the value of a relation between Iran and
Israel. In the Shah's view, Iran's problems were all due to security issues.
"The attainment of social, economic and political development as well as true
independence, all hinged, in the last analysis, on the achievement of
security."125 The chief threat to Iranian security was from the Soviet Union
which bordered Iran to the north, interfered in Afghanistan to the east, and
supported Arab nationalist movements in the west. Nasser's alignment with
the Soviet Union and the 1955 Czechoslovakia arms deal coupled with his anti-
Iranian rhetoric increased the perceived threat to stability in the region. These
fears were exacerbated by the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
Qassim quickly established ties with Egypt, Syria and the Soviet Union. He

,24Sobhani, p. 13.

125Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 258.

83

abrogated the 1937 treaty concerning the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and border
disturbances increased. As a balance to this threat, Israel provided a good
alliance partner. It had not only proven its military superiority again in the
1956 war, but the Shah perceived that Israel could provide economic
assistance as well as an inside link to Washington.

In order to enhance security and to facilitate the consolidation of
his power, the Shah created the security service, SAVAK, in 1956. In 1957, the
Shah proposed increased cooperation between the Israeli Mossad and SAVAK.
The Mossad began training SAVAK agents and the security service link became
the mechanism for discreet diplomatic relations. A regional alliance between
Mossad, SAVAK and the Turkish security service TNSS was established to
share intelligence on the activities of the communists and Arab nationalists in
the region. The Mossad and SAVAK cooperated in arming the separatist
Kurdish movement in Iraq.

The failure of the United States to come to the aid of CENTO
member Pakistan's aid in its war with India in 1965 led to the realization that
ties with the United States were of limited value in regional conflicts. The
Shah, whose armed forces were dependent on the U.S. for arms and advisors,
sought to diversify his arms suppliers. Israel once again was in the ideal
position to fill this role. The Israeli Defense Force was highly respected for its
performance against the Arab forces. Israeli weapons were also highly
regarded. In 1964 Iran purchased Uzi submachine guns and signed, in 1966,

84

an agreement for an additional $6 million arms package. Israel's ties to
Washington served to overcome Congressional resistance to the sale of
advanced arms to Iran. In 1967, the head of the Israeli delegation to Iran
asked the U.S. ambassador if the United States was trying to "Throw the Shah
into the arms of the Russians?"126 The combined influence off Israeli pressure
on President Johnson and Soviet arms sales to Iran, (see above) removed
opposition to the subsequent sale of two squadrons of F-4s to Iran. As the
relationship matured, Iran and Israel participated in joint ventures to produce
a long range surface to surface missile, electronic counter measures for Iranian
fighter aircraft and also participated in a joint naval cooperation program.

The Shah was willing to sell oil to any interested nation,
including Israel. These sales began in 1957 and continued for twenty years.
At a time when its foreign exchange reserves were low, Iran bartered oil for
Israeli arms. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iran participated in a joint
venture to construct a pipeline from the Red Sea port of Elat to Israel's
Mediterranean coast. With the Suez Canal closed, it was cheaper to ship oil to
Mediterranean through the pipeline than around Africa in supertanker which
were too large to be serviced at many of the Mediterranean ports. The Iranian

126Sobhani, p. 52.

85

guarantee of oil deliveries to replace Sinai crude were a key element of the
agreement to return the Sinai to Egypt.127

Following a massive earthquake in 1962, the Shah sought Israeli
aid in its reconstruction efforts. An Israeli team developed and implemented a
four stage development plan which emphasized water development,
agricultural planning, the development of kibbutz style farming communities
and a reorganization of marketing techniques. This plan was approved the
Iranian parliament; Israeli participation, however, was down played.
Economic relations between the two nations increased. By the end of the
1960s, trade amounted to $250 million annually.

Relations between Pahlavi Iran and Israel developed and thrived
in response to the security dilemma both states faced. Both Israel and Iran
were surrounded by hostile states. While both states had ties to the United
States, it became obvious to Israel as a result of the U.S. position in the 1956
war and to Iran as a result of the U. S. failure to support Pakistan in 1965, that
the United States would not necessarily support them in regional conflicts.
Both Israel and Iran must be prepared to defend themselves. The imperatives
of the international system ensured that the relationship between Iran and
Israel would continue at the level required to promote the security of the allies.

Ayatollah Khomeini had long proclaimed a vitriolic hatred for
Israel. He spoke publicly against relations with the "gang of Jews" who ran

,27Sobhani, p. 118.

86

Israel and the need to "uproot this germ of corruption."128 In one of his first
acts of foreign policy during the his pursuit of international isolation,
Khomeini closed the discreet Israeli embassy and turned it over to the PLO.
While Iran professed the desire to "have friendly relations, based on reciprocal
respect..."129, the nature of the state of Israel "permit(s) no compromise, as far
as an Islamic State is concerned."130 Following the advent of the war with Iraq,
Khomeini proclaimed that "the next stop after 'conquering Baghdad' is the
'liberation of Jerusalem.'"131

Despite this hostile rhetoric, the regional system remained as
hostile to the Islamic Republic as it had to the Pahiavi regime. The Iraqi
invasion brought this situation clearly into focus. As a result of the hostage
crisis, the United States had instituted an arms embargo against Iran. The
Iranian armed forces were dependent on U.S. arms; Iran was forced to turn to
western sources to resupply its war machine. Israel began supplying Iran with

128Bakhash, p. 37

129Foreign Minister Yazdi, Oct 1979, quoted in Menashri, p. 95.

130Maziar Behrooz, " Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, 1979-1988" in Neither East Nor West, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United
States, ed. by Nikki Keddie and Mark Gasiorowski, (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1990), p. 15.

131Sobhani, p. 142.

87

spare parts and arms in 1979. By 1986, Israeli arms sales to Iran had grown to
$500 million annually.132

In addition to the obvious economic benefits, Sobhani cites two
important reasons that Israel agreed to supply weapons to the Islamic
Republic, safety for Iranian Jews and the regional balance of power. Despite
public and constitutional assurances of religious freedom for Jews, Israel
became convinced that "Khomeini's passionate hatred of Israel had clearly
extended to Iran's Jewish community."133 In order to facilitate the emigration of
Iranian Jews, a tacit agreement was made with the Khomeini regime to
exchange spare parts. Between 1979 and 1987, it is estimated that over 55,000
Jews, out of a population of approximately 80,000, emigrated from Iran.

The utility of Israeli arms did not prevent Iran from attacking
Israeli interests when the opportunity arose. When Israel invaded Lebanon in
1982, Iran deployed Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in support of the
Lebanese Shia. These forces supported unconventional attacks on Israeli
interests. In retaliation for a truck bomb attack on their military headquarters
in 1983, Israel conducted air raids which killed 23 Revolutionary Guardsmen.
These conflicts, however, did not diminish the systemic conditions favoring a
pragmatic entente and did not interrupt the flow of arms from Israel to Iran.

132Sobhani, p. 141.
133Sobhani, p. 145.

88

The heart of the "pragmatic entente" between Iran and Israel was
based upon systemic factors. By tying down Iraqi forces, Iran prevented Iraq
from actively supporting the front line Arab states in their struggle with Israel.
The war also drove a wedge between Arab states. "Thus since 1980, two of
Israel's most vociferous enemies-Syria and Libya-worked to undermine another
of Israel's traditional enemies, Iraq."134 Despite Khomeini's anti Israel rhetoric
during Iran's war with Iraq, Israel continued to be an important supplier of
western arms and a key link in Iran's attempts to pursue less tense relations
with Washington.

2. Turkey.

The fall of the Ottoman and Qajar dynasties in the wake of World
War I saw the end of decades, even centuries, of competition and strained
relations between Iran and Turkey and set the stage for the modern era of
cooperation between these Muslim, non-Arab, neighbors. The regimes of both
Reza Shah and Kemal Attaturk, aggressively pursued a western-oriented
effort to rapidly modernize their nations. It was natural for these nations to
align in the face of perceived great power expansionism.135 This alliance was
first formalized under the Sa'adabad pact in 1937. This pact did not have
provisions for unilateral or joint military activities, thus was of little value in

134Sobhani, p. 150.

135Graham Fuller, The Center of the Universe, The Geopolitics of Iran, (Boulder,
San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 211.

89

deterring foreign aggression. It did however, provide the precedent for the
alliances which succeeded it.

While the Sa'adabad pact was not specifically targeted at any
particular state, the Baghdad Pact, signed by Mohammed Reza Shah in 1955,
was clearly the result of cold war politics. This pact targeted Soviet
expansionism in the region. The chief threat, as perceived by alliance
members, was not an invasion from the Soviets, but its subversive support for
"regional radicalism."136 With the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958,
the Baghdad alliance was transformed into CENTO. As noted above, the
failure of the United States to come to the assistance of Baghdad Pact/CENTO
members Iraq during the revolt against the monarch, Pakistan during its
conflict with India over Kashmir and Turkey with its conflict with Greece, led
these alliance members to question its usefulness in regional vice superpower
disputes. This dissatisfaction led to the establishment of a purely regional
forum, the Regional Cooperation for Development. This alliance between Iran,
Turkey and Pakistan proposed "mutual military and diplomatic support during
any crisis. Nonetheless, the RCD's capabilities as a security pact, were clearly
limited, as even the name implies."137

Iran and Turkey were also joined with Israel in a discreet
alliance of their security services, Trident. Meetings were typically held every

136Fuller, p. 213 original emphasis.
137Fuller, p 214.

90

six months to "exchange intelligence information.. .(and to) recommend
appropriate policy responses."138 The Turks , however, played a peripheral role
in Trident, which was primarily a vehicle for Iranian-Israeli cooperation.

Despite these regional alliances and a shared secular, western
oriented ideology, relations between Turkey and Iran were correct, but not
close. Ankara did not appreciate the joint CIA, Mossad, SAVAK support for
the Kurdish separatist movement in Iraq due to the impact these efforts had on
the large minority of "mountain Turks" (Kurds) in eastern Turkey. These
diplomatic alliances also failed to lead to closer economic ties as both countries
preferred to trade with the west.. Relations between the states were also
strained by the 1973 oil price hike. While Iran was awash in oil profits,
Turkey faced severe balance of payments problems, "in a large part due to its
heavy oil import bill."139 The Shah refused Turkish requests for rescheduling
its debt.

Following the revolution, Iran withdrew from its formal alliances
with Turkey. Turkey remained a NATO member, serving "U.S. regional
interests," whose commitment to secular nationalism was "anathema to" Iran's

138Sobhani, p. 29.

139Fuat Borovali, "Iran and Turkey: Permanent Revolution or Islamism in
One Country?", in Iran at the Crossroads, Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade,
ed. by Miron Rezun, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p.
83.

91

"ideology of Islamic revolutionary universalism."140 Iran supported "Islamic
radicalism in Turkey and propaganda efforts among Turkish workers" Over
half-million Iranian refugees made Turkey their home which exacerbated
tensions between the neighbors.

The chief source of tension between Ankara and the Shah also
emerged to strain relations between Ankara and the revolutionary regime in
Tehran. In an attempt to undermine Saddam Hussein, Khomeini engaged in
the time honored Iranian practice of supporting Iraqi Kurdish separatists. This
support once again resulted in increased Kurdish guerilla activity in Turkey as
well as Iraq. Ankara negotiated an agreement with Baghdad to allow either
country to cross the border to engage in hot pursuit of Kurdish guerillas.
Turkish Air Force assaults on the positions of Iran's Kurdish allies in Iraq were
viewed by Tehran as evidence of Turkish irredentist claims and territorial
claims on the oil rich Kirkuk and Mosul provinces.141

Despite these divisive security issues and ideological differences,
Turkey became an important source of trade with Iran when it chose to ignore
the American sponsored embargo of Iran. Following the destruction of its
southern ports in the war with Iraq, Turkey also became an important trading
route to Europe for Iranian goods. Turkey attempted to maintain ties with
both Iran and Iraq, undertaking diplomatic efforts to end the war.

140Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 134.
141Borovali, p. 86.

92

The cease fire with Iraq removed some of the sources of conflict
between Turkey and Iran, but also removed some of the imperatives for
continued relations. The end of threats to Iranian gulf shipping reduced the
importance of Turkey as a trading route and western willingness to participate
in Iranian reconstruction reduced trade opportunities between the neighbors.
Khomeini indicated his commitment to regional cooperation however by
supporting the 1988 initiative establishing an Economic Cooperation
Organization. This organization, mirroring the Shah-era RCD, supports
increased economic ties between Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and possibly
Afghanistan. Despite the radically different nature of Iran's internal attributes
following the Islamic revolution, and Turkeys continued alliance with Iran's
ideological enemy, there was a remarkable similarity in the nature of Turkey's
relations with both Iranian regimes. The chief source of tension in both cases
was Iranian support for Iraqi Kurdish dissidents which increased Kurdish
guerilla activity in Turkey. The chief source of cooperation in both cases was
support for regional economic alliances between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.
Systemic factors palled a dominate role in the relations between Iran and
Turkey.

3. Pakistan.

Iran, under the Shah, had good relations with Pakistan, which it
viewed as an important security buffer between it and the most significant
south- Asian power, India. Following the military buildup which drastically

93

improved its capability after 1973, Iran offered its military support to Pakistan
in the event of an Indian attack. Tehran refused Pakistani requests for
weapons, however, in order to reassure India. It did provide substantial
amounts of financial aid and engaged in joint economic development programs
with Pakistan.

Despite Pakistan's continued alliance with the United States, it
continued to share strategic security interests with Iran. The Khomeini regime
continued to honor its pre-revolution treaties and agreements with Pakistan. It
also continued to provide an important trade route to China and continued to
provide a source of nuclear cooperation.142 Fear of Soviet expansionism led
Pakistan to seek good relations with Tehran. Immediately following the
revolution, Pakistan feared a Soviet invasion in Iran. With the Soviet presence
in Iran, Pakistan would have been surrounded by three pro-Soviet states. The
Soviet presence in Afghanistan was also a source of tension; Iran and Pakistan
backed different factions of the anti-Soviet opposition. Both Iran and Pakistan
supported various guerrilla movements fighting the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. Their support for different factions in this effort, however,
inhibited the development of closer relations.

Khomeini's relations with Pakistan continued to mirror the Shah's
polices. Both countries opposed Soviet regional expansion and supported

142Ashok Kapur, "Relations With Pakistan and India", in Iran at the
Crossroads, Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. by Miron Rezun,
(Boulder,San Francisco,Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 78.

94

increased joint economic initiatives. Pakistan is one of the only nations with
which Khomeini honored the previous regime's formal relations. Systemic
factors were clearly decisive in the formulation of Iranian policy toward
Pakistan.

C RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

The basic conflicts between Iran and its Arab neighbors predate the
Islamic revolution by centuries. "The Irano-Arab power conflict over the
Persian Gulf was in full bloom as early as the fourth century, and the
subsequent centuries provided no real basis for political accommodation."143
Ancient Iranian claims to Bahrain and other Persian Gulf islands continue to
confound attempts at reconciliation between contemporary Iran and its
neighbors.

As noted above, the Middle East is a very dynamic regional system.
Alignments between these regional powers changed rapidly in the decades
preceding the Islamic Revolution. Throughout this period, the Shah sought to
expand his regional influence in order to "enhance Iran's regional stability and
security..." through his opposition to communism and "Arab revolutionary
nationalism."144 During this period the nature of Iranian relations with Egypt,
Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States changed, growing closer and farther as these

143Ramazani, The Persian Gulf, Iran 's Role, p. 34.
144Saikal, p. 162.

95

states engaged in frequent balancing behavior in the region. Despite the many-
changes wrought by the Islamic revolution, once in power, Khomeini's
relations to the Arab world were very similar to that of the Shah. "On coming
to power, the Islamic regime formally rejected Iranian nationalism, yet, in fact,
its perceptions of Iran's interests in the Persian Gulf and its regional role are
identical to those of the Iranian nationalists and the statements made by the
Islamic Republic's officials about the Persian Gulf echo those of the Shah."145
1. Iraq.

Centuries of Iranian- Arab rivalry and decades of border disputes
along the Shatt-al-Arab were submerged by systemic factors which led to the
adherence of both Iran and Iraq to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. "Spurred on... by
their common perceptions of the potential threat of Communism, the two
states relegated their differences to the sidelines and began to focus their
attention on forging a viable regional security organization to cope with
external threats to area."146 This cooperation between the two states was short-
lived. Once the monarchy was overthrown in 1958, and Iraq changed from a
pro-west to a pro-Soviet regime, tensions between these gulf neighbors
naturally heightened. Tensions increased and border disturbance rose, Iranian

145Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 99.

146Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 13.

96

statements appeared to repudiate the 1937 treaty which had previously been
accepted as the basis for a final border settlement along the Shatt-al-Arab.

In addition to the continuing dispute over the Shatt-al -Arab
border, other issues precluded better relations between Tehran and Baghdad.
In the early 1960s, the oil companies began to explore and develop the offshore
oil concessions. Tensions grew as Iran and Iraq both exploited oil fields fed by
a "common subterranean source."147 Secondly, Iran sought to manipulate
subversive Kurdish elements in Iraq, setting up a transmitter in Kermanshah to
broadcast propaganda in Kurdish. In an attempt to deal with these issues, the
president and prime minister of Iraq visited Iran in 1967 and 1968; any
progress achieved was short-lived as the Iraqi regime was ousted in a coup
d'etat by the Ba'ath party in July, 1968.

The new Ba'ath regime initially attempted to prevent relations
between Baghdad and Tehran from deteriorating further, but these attempts
failed when the Shah unilaterally abrogated the 1937 treaty in 1969. Cold war
raged between the two nations. SAVAK, supported by the CIA and the
MOSSAD continued to provide support for Kurdish separatist elements in
northern Iraq. Tehran viewed the 1972 friendship treaty between Iraq and the
U.S.S.R. as a Soviet attempt to surround Iran with Soviet satellites. Iranian aid
to Iraqi Kurds increased dramatically, by 1975 regular Iranian forces were
providing the Kurdish insurgence in Iraq with anti-aircraft support. This

147Abdulghani, p. 20.

97

support led to direct engagement between regular Iraqi and Iranian forces in
northern Iraq.148

With Iraq allied to the Soviets and Iran to the American's,
systemic pressures added to the specific issues of contention between the two
neighbors. Once the British announced their intention to withdraw from the
region in 1969, both states acted to increase their regional influence. Iranian
seizure of Abu Musa and the Tunbs was condemned by Baghdad and Iraqi
perception of British duplicity in this takeover led to the break in relations
between Baghdad and London. Iraqi claims to the "territory" of Kuwait
increased tensions with both Iran and Kuwait as Iraq sought to deploy troops
to oppose Iran on Kuwaiti territory.149 Iraq provided aid to the Dhofari rebel
troops in Oman while Iran sent troops to support the embattled monarch.

A brief respite in the cold war between Baghdad and Tehran was
initiated by the Algiers agreement of 1975. This agreement provided for Iraqi
submission to Iranian demands on the demarcation of borders along the Shatt
al-Arab river in return for the end of Iranian support for the Kurdish
insurgents. Iraq ended its support for the rebels in Oman and used its
influence in South Yemen to seek the end its support for the Dhofaris. The
rapprochement between Tehran and Baghdad continued until the Islamic
revolution with normal, but not close relations between the two neighbors.

148Abdulghani, p. 142.
149Abdulghani, p. 98.

98

Different views by Iran and Iraq on the character of Gulf Security led to the
total collapse of the Gulf Security Conference attended the eight Gulf littoral
states in 1976.

Following the fall of the Iranian monarch, tensions between Iran
and Iraq increased significantly. Iraq reported over 500 Iranian violations of
Iraqi territorial borders and Iran reported over 800 such violations in the first
19 months of the Islamic Republic. In September 1980, Iraq abrogated the
Algiers agreement and asserted Iraqi control of the disputed waterway. Iraq
was at the pinnacle of its political, economic and military power, Iran was
militarily weak and disorganized, internationally isolated and under an
economic embargo; Iraqi forces invaded Iran and full scale war erupted on 22
September, 1980. Iraq's requirements for ending the war included Iranian
recognition of Iraqi rights on the Shatt al-Arab and the return of Abu Musa
and the Tunbs to Arab control.

The Iraqi invasion provided the wake up call that the Islamic
Republic required and the new regime began the rapid socialization process
that participation in the international system required. Iranian nationalism,
previously denied by the Islamic Republic, experienced a resurgence. The
regular armed forces were rehabilitated and rearmed. Iran engaged in
behavior toward Iraq that was very similar to that of the Shah, supporting
Kurdish separatist movements in northern Iraq and even dealing with Israel
for arms. Despite the repugnance with which Khomeini viewed any decision

99

to end the war short of victory, he ultimately made the decision that "was
more deadly than drinking hemlock,"150 due to pressures form the international
system. Relations with Iraq, more than any other state illustrate the definitive
role that systemic factors play in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy.
2. Syria.

The relations between Syria and Iran under the monarchy were
largely the influenced by the east-west cold war, relations between Syria and
the Islamic Republic were largely influenced by the regional balance of power.
Thus, while relations between the two nations changed following the
revolution, it is still possible to clearly see the impact of systemic factors.

Ba'athist Syria's regional alignment with Egypt and international
alignment with the Soviets precluded close relations between Tehran and
Damascus. Syria supported Egyptian claims that Khuzistan was part of the
Arab nation and joined Nasser in condemning Iranian relations with Israel.
Soviet support for Syria and Iraq led to increased U.S. aid to Iran in the early
1970s. The easing of international polarization in 1970s also led to a thaw in
Irano-Arab relations. As the 1960s ended, Egypt's president Nasser became
less dependent on the Soviets. Iranian calls for the end of Israeli occupation of
territories seized in 1967 coupled with Egyptian support for the Rogers peace

150Wright, p. 190.

100

initiative in 1970 led to closer ties between the Shah and Nasser.15 This also

led to better ties and Iranian investment and economic aid to Syria.1'2 Ba'athist

Syrian estrangement from Ba'athist Iraq, with which Iran engaged in persistent

disputes (see above), also served to increase Syrian-Iranian ties. Iran also

served as an important link between Washington and Damascus which

provided a Syria with an alternative to the Soviet Union.133

Following the Iraqi invasion, an alliance of convenience was

established between Islamic Iran and Ba'athist Syria, despite their diametrically

opposed ideologies.

Given their fundamental differences, the alliance between Syria and Iran
has been intriguing, the former is secular and Arab nationalist, whereas
the latter is Islamic and outspokenly anti-nationalist. Syria has a large
Islamic movement which it has brutally suppressed, and regional ambitions
of the two countries have also been incompatible. Nevertheless, while
tense and tenuous.. .the Syria-Iranian alliance has held longer than would
logically been expected.154

While Syria opposed a complete Iranian victory leading to an

Islamic Republic in Iraq, it hoped for "a situation in which Saddam Hussein's

collapse under Iranian pressure would allow it to determine his successor."153

151Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy, p. 422.

152Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy 1960-1976: an Overview," in
Twentieth Century Iran, ed. by Hossein Amirsadeghi, (New York: Holmes and
Meir Publishers, 1977), p.204.

153Chubin, p. 212, 216.

154Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 122.

155Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 122.

101

In addition to weakening its Arab rival, an alliance with Iran provided
financial incentives as well. Syria not only obtained oil from Iran worth
several billion dollars, tit obtained financial concession from Gulf Arab states
to use its influence on their behalf in Tehran. Iran, in addition to the military
equipment channeled to it through Syria, was able to damage Iraq
economically, Syria shut down the oil pipeline that transported up to 500,000
barrels of Iraqi oil through Syria, to the Mediterranean. The alliance with Syria
also allowed Iran to argue that its war with Iraq was not based on Persian-
Arab conflict, and that only the"reactionary and corrupt Arabs sided with
Iraq."156

This alliance against Iraq did not extend to all other areas of
regional significance. Iran and Syria, while both opposing increased Israeli
influence in Lebanon, pursued opposing objectives in this chaotic state. Iran
supported the creation of an Islamic government in Lebanon, while Syria
supported the creation of any style of government which it could dominate.
Iran deployed Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa valley in 1982. This
contingent was responsible for organizing and training the Hezbollah, which
became rival to the Syrian supported Islamic Amal in Lebanon. In May 1988,
regular Syrian forces invaded Lebanon and asserted Syrian control over events
in its chaotic neighbor. These clashes in Lebanon failed, however, to derail the
alliance against Iraq.

156Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 123.

102

While relations between Iran and Syria improved following the
Islamic revolution, this alliance was clearly the result of systemic factors, not
due to the drastic changes in the domestic politics, political elite of the regime
ideology.

3. The Gulf States.

The Persian Gulf has long been the focus of Iranian attention.
The British announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw its forces from the
Gulf by 1971, facilitated the realization of the Shah's ambitions. Tehran scored
points with the Gulf Arab countries when it acknowledged the independence
oi the island of Bahrain. At the same time Iran concluded agreements on the
division of the continental shelf, and thus oil concession rights, with Kuwait,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia.157 Tensions with the gulf states mounted however,
when Iran occupied three disputed islands located near the straights of
Hormuz. Iran also cooperated with the Gulf Arabs in creating the oil cartel,
OPEC.

Iran also exerted its influence in the early 1970 when it joined
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Jordan and Great Britain in supporting the government
of Oman against the Soviet backed rebels in the Dhofari rebellion. While
Oman was strategically important to Iran, located at the Straights of Hormuz,
support for the Monarch also served as an opportunity to confront Iran's
persistent opponent, Iraq, which was supporting the rebels.

157Saikal,p. 165.

103

Despite these apparent regional successes in foreign policy, the
Shah was unable to rally much support for his vision of a regional collective
security organization. Regional powers viewed Iran's rapid military buildup
with suspicion. These regional powers, chiefly Saudi Arabia, sought to balance
perceived Iranian pursuit of hegemony by expanding their own military and
economic capabilities. The expansion in military capabilities of such
"moderate" states as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia "provided justification for such
'radical' countries as Iraq and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen to
increase their defense expenditures in order to guard themselves against
possible consequences of the Iranian military build-up."158 The Shah's attempt
to ensure Iranian security led to a regional arms race, a classic example of the
effects of the "security dilemma."159 The Shah's regional ambitions also led to
Saudi attempts to undermine his efforts through the forum of the OPEC cartel.
Iran required massive oil revenues to achieve its military and domestic
spending requirements. Saudi Arabia, with much larger oil reserves and a
much smaller population, could meet all of its requirements for revenues. In
order to reduce the Shah's capabilities, Saudi Arabia opposed the 1975-1976 oil
price hikes proposed by Iran. When OPEC agreed to implement a 15 percent

158Saikal, p. 198.

159The term "security dilemma" refers to the systemic effect that results
from one state's efforts to improve its security by improving its capabilities.
This change in the distribution of capabilities undermines the security of other
states in the system. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security
Dilemma", in World Politics, Vol. 30 No. 2 January, 1978, p. 167-214.

104

price hike in January 1977, the Saudis announced that they would hold the line
at 5 percent and would expand production by 20 percent to lessen the impact
of the price hike by the other producers. This measure caused a 1,500,000
barrel per day drop in Iranian oil sales, significantly impacting the Shah's
ability to simultaneously modernize his armed forces and his domestic
economy. It also clearly established Saudi hegemony in OPEC politics.

As his reign came to a close, the Shah was failed to realize his
dreams of a regional security arrangement dominated by Iran. His pursuit of
regional hegemony was countered by regional balancing by the very states he
hoped to coopt into his sphere of influence.

The reaction of the gulf states to the Islamic revolution was
initially mixed. Those states that feared the Shah's ambition viewed favorably
Bazargan's assertion that Iran would no longer serve as the regions gendarme,
as was the end of Tehran's relations with Israel.160 This favor was short lived
as these same regimes began to fear the exportation of the Islamic revolution.
Iranian seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and subversion in
Bahrain and Kuwait further exacerbated these fears. Following the Iraqi
invasion, the gulf states created the Gulf Cooperation Council in an effort to
balance the threat of the two regional hegemons. Iran perceived this alliance
as an anti Iranian military alliance which would be dominated by Iran's

160Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Arab World", in Iran at the Crossroads,
Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. by Miron Rezun, (Boulder, San
Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 104.

105

historic rival, Saudi Arabia. This failed to occur in the first decade following
the Islamic revolution, which reduced Iranian fears to some degree.

Iran continued to promote a regional forum for security in the
region, as long as Iran was allowed to participate. Indeed, Iranian
participation was viewed in Tehran as vital to the success of any security
regime. Any attempt to ignore the vital role that Iran could play as the most
powerful and most populous state in the region was doomed to fail. The UAE
and Oman, friendly to Pahlavi Iran, continued their lucrative trade with
Islamic Iran, despite being labeled as traitors by Baghdad.161 Saudi Arabia,
Iran's persistent, powerful gulf rival, and Kuwait, subject to coercive influence
by neighboring Iraq, continued to oppose Iranian objectives in the gulf. These
states resorted to the tactic that had proven so useful to the Saudis half a
decade earlier-conducting economic warfare against Iran through their ability
to control oil prices. This policy was once again devastating to the Iranian
economy. Saudi success in these efforts led to a gradual warming of relations
between the monarchy and the Islamic Republic. This warming was illustrated
by a joint agreement to stabilize oil prices and through an exchange of visits
by government ministers. Close relation between the two regimes was
precluded, however, by their continued competition for influence in the region.

Relations between Islamic Iran and the gulf states were largely
similar to that of Pahlavi Iran, despite the destabilizing effects of years of

161Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 117.

106

conflict between Iran and Iraq. Systemic factors continued to drive the
behavior of gulf states, despite the drastic changes in the regime in Tehran.

107

VI. CONCLUSION

There are two very different orientations that attempt to explain state
behavior in international politics. State level theorists argue that internal
attributes such as domestic politics, composition of the political elite and the
regime's ideology are decisive in determining a state's foreign policy.
Structuralists, on the other hand, contend that these internal attributes are
unimportant, or at best secondary, in explaining a state's external behavior.
This thesis has examined the case of Iran in order to determine which theory is
better at explaining its behavior international politics following the Islamic
Revolution.

The case of Iran has clearly demonstrated that the structuralists more
accurately explain state behavior in vital issues of foreign policy.
Structuralists, by definition, are only concerned with issues that effect the
security of a nation: "The survival motive is taken as the ground of action
where the security of the state is not assured, rather than as a realistic
description of the impulse that lies behind every act of state"162 In issues
regarding regime survival, neither domestic politics, composition of the
political elite, nor regime ideology made any difference. When confronted
with annihilation by the Iraqi invasion, Iran abandoned its efforts to isolate
itself from the international system and sought arms from its most repugnant

162Waltz, p. 92.

108

ideological enemies, the U.S., Israel and the Soviet Union. It engaged in
balancing behavior, allying with Syria, a secular state based on Arab
nationalism. It sought to market its oil to anv nation that would purchase it,
often selling on the spot market to American companies, below the posted
price. Relations between Islamic Iran and the superpowers waxed and waned
depending on the level of threat that Iran perceived was posed by the
opposing superpower. Iran sought to undermine the forces arrayed against it
in the gulf through conciliatory policies toward regimes such as the U.A.E. and
Qatar that were sympathetic to its views. In short, Iran was, as predicted by
structural theory, socialized by, and participated in, the international system.

Structural theory only goes so far, however, in explaining state behavior,
and is of little use explaining issues that do not impact the survival of the
nation. In these issues, domestic politics does matter. Relations between Iran
and the world clearly changed following the revolution. Iran severed its
alliances with the U.S. and CENTO and attempted to isolate itself from the
international system dominated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It sought to
expand its revolution to neighboring states and encouraged the "oppressed
peoples" to rise up against their "corrupt illegitimate governments." The
American hostage crisis of 1979 was a key element of the efforts of the clerics
to consolidate their rule to the exclusion of the liberal elements. The revelation
of the arms for hostages deal was the result of the continuing power struggle
in the Islamic republic between the various factions of the clerical leadership.

109

It must be noted, however, that structuralists would not attempt to explain
these types of issues based on a structural theory of international politics.

The case of Iran also illustrates that ideology makes little difference in
the conduct of relations between nations. Whether purchasing arms,
marketing its oil or soliciting financial assistance, ideology has not been a
constraint on the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Rhetoric is designed
for the press and for popular consumption, not as serious foreign policy
initiatives.

Although this thesis specifically addressed theoretical issues, it does
have some serious practical implications. Revolutionary states such as Iran,
the current regime in Haiti and Islamic regimes that are threatening to emerge
in various Middle Eastern states, are clearly constrained by the international
system. It is certainly possible, and in some cases likely, that theses states will
oppose U.S. strategic or regional interests, but they are still vulnerable to
traditional power politics. As ideology is apparently unimportant in the
conduct of relations between states, the administration should pay as little
attention as possible to the rhetoric these states profess, while pursuing
traditional political and military diplomatic efforts to ensure U.S. interests.

While revolutionary states are constrained and socialized by the
international system, this does not give a clear indication of the type of
behavior to expect from these regimes. With the fall of the Soviet Union and
the end of the bipolar world, the range of possible behaviors has drastically

110

changed. Although the Soviet Union is not around to offer assistance to states
opposing U.S. interests, the U.S. cannot use the threat of Soviet domination to
keep its allies in line. States are less constrained by the system and may
engage in economic and diplomatic relations with virtually any other state in
the international system. It is much more difficult for the U.S. to isolate a
given state, especially if that state possesses geostrategic or important
economic importance. Even IR theorists, committed to the structural
orientation, are unable to agree on the current formation of the international
system and the types of constraints on international behavior that it entails.

Ill

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